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THE COLLISION OF LAW AND
SCIENCE:
AMERICAN COURT RESPONSES TO
DEVELOPMENTS IN FORENSIC
SCIENCE
Sarah Lucy Cooper*
Introduction
In 2013, our scientific and technological capabilities
continue to exceed all expectations. The capacity of DNA1
evidence to identify specific sources consistently and with a
*Sarah Lucy Cooper is a Senior Lecturer in Law at Birmingham City
University’s Centre for American Legal Studies in the UK, and a Fellow at
the Arizona Justice at Arizona State University. I would like to thank my two
research assistants, Alice Storey and Daniel Gough who always do a superb
job. I would also like to thank Dr. Jon Yorke, Dr. Haydn Davies, Professor
Meryl Thomas, Professor Alex Kendall, Dr. Anne Richardson-Oakes,
Professor Carrie Sperling, Professor Carolyn Hoyle, Professor Lissa Griffin,
Paul Cooper, Christine Cooper, and Terri Smith for reviewing and discussing
the themes of this paper with me. Finally, I would like to thank the Academy
of Criminal Justice Sciences for allowing me to share an earlier draft of this
paper at its annual conference in NYC in March 2012.
1. Donald E. Shelton, Twenty-First Century Forensic Science Challenges
for Trial Judges in Criminal Cases: Where the “Polybutadiene” Meets the
“Bitumen”, 18 WIDENER L.J. 309, 320 (2009).
DNA is the molecular structure in all living things
that contains genetic information. DNA evidence is very
durable and can be extracted from the smallest of remains
many years after a crime. Equally significant is its
“polymorphism,” meaning that, depending on the method
used for its extraction, it is unique among humans and can
identify the donor of the specimen with overwhelming
accuracy. DNA testing can be extremely precise and can
often demonstrate that only one person in billions could
have been the source of the specimen evidence.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
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high degree of certainty has been rigorously tested,2 and it is
widely accepted that a vast array of forensic sciences can
engage in “individualization,” that is, identify the perpetrator
of a crime “to the exclusion of all others.”3 With recent studies
showing that jurors have an increased thirst for scientific
evidence,4 these forensic sciences have rapidly re-shaped the
criminal process.5 As such, television shows like CSI suggest
forensic evidence is seamlessly and justifiably weaved into
American courtrooms. In reality, however, the criminal justice
system wrestles with scientific evidence, and its reliance on
forensic science to identify criminals with absolute accuracy is
troubling.
Recently, the ability of many forensic sciences to engage in
individualization has been called in to question. There are a
number of reasons for this. First, DNA evidence has become
the gold-standard by which other forensic techniques are

2. See THE COMM. ON IDENTIFYING THE NEEDS OF THE FORENSIC SCI.
CMTY., NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., STRENGTHENING THE
FORENSIC SCIENCES IN THE UNITED STATES: A PATH FORWARD 7 (2009)
[hereinafter NAS REPORT]. Although note that DNA evidence is not infallible.
See Shelton, supra note 1, at 323-24.
Although DNA profiling is clearly scientifically
superior to other forensic identification evidence, it is not—
contrary to earlier pronouncements—infallible. DNA
evidence and its underlying methodology are, of course,
subject to human error. False positive DNA results have
occurred and will undoubtedly continue to be part of the
DNA testing landscape. Proffered evidence may still, as
with other forensic science evidence, be the result of
mistakes or contamination in its collection, testing, or
interpretation. As the technology and methodology of DNA
testing has progressed, it is the human errors that may
present the biggest evidentiary challenges for trial judges.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
3. Michael J. Saks, Merlin and Solomon: Lessons from the Law’s
Encounters with Forensic Identification Science, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 1069, 1082,
1119 (1998) (quoting another source).
4. Donald E. Shelton, Young S. Kim & Gregg Barak, A Study of Juror
Expectations and Demands Concerning Scientific Evidence: Does the “CSI
Effect” Exist?, 9 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 331, 333 (2006).
5. See generally Shelton, supra note 1 (discussing the rapid development
of emerging technologies and their tremendous impact on the justice system).
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judged.6 Unlike many forensic sciences, prolific testing has led
to DNA evidence having a quantifiable and miniscule error
rate.7 Thus, DNA has raised the bar as to what is scientifically
acceptable for identifying a source “to the exclusion of all
others.” Second, DNA evidence has revealed a disturbing
number of wrongful convictions. To date, 302 people have been
exonerated by post- conviction DNA evidence in the United
States,8 and in over fifty percent of those cases, invalidated or
improper forensic evidence played a role in convicting the
defendant.9 Thus, the methodologies of many forensic sciences
have been exposed as unreliable. Third, in 2009, the National
Academy of Sciences (“NAS”) produced a landmark report—
Strengthening Forensic Science in the United States: A Path
Forward (“NAS Report”)—which concluded that “[w]ith the
exception of nuclear DNA analysis, . . . no forensic method has
been rigorously shown to have the capacity to consistently, and
with a high degree of certainty, demonstrate a connection
between evidence and a specific individual or source.”10 Soon
after the report was published, the United States Supreme
Court acknowledged that many forensic sciences are subject to
“[s]erious deficiencies.”11
This paper considers how American courts have responded
to developments in forensic science by focusing on four popular
forensic science disciplines: (1) fingerprint identification
(friction ridge analysis); (2) firearms identification (tool-mark
analysis); (3) bite mark identification (forensic odontology); and
(4) arson investigation (fire science). Part I briefly explores the
relationship between law and science. Part II charts the
development of the legal frameworks that govern the
admissibility of expert evidence in America. Part III discusses
the identification methods employed by these four disciplines
6. NAS REPORT, supra note 2, at 8.
7. See id. at 7.
8. Facts on Post Conviction DNA Exonerations, INNOCENCE PROJECT,
http://www.innocenceproject.org/Content/Facts_on_PostConviction_DNA_Exo
nerations.php (last visited Jan. 20, 2013).
9. Unreliable or Improper Forensic Science, INNOCENCE PROJECT,
http://www.innocenceproject.org/understand/Unreliable-Limited-Science.php
(last visited Jan. 7, 2012).
10. NAS REPORT, supra note 2, at 7.
11. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 319 (2009).
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and provides examples of erroneous identifications. Part IV
comments on the NAS Report findings that relate to these four
disciplines. Part V critically surveys responses by criminal
courts between 1999 and 2011 to various admissibility
challenges raised with respect to these four disciplines. Part VI
concludes that over recent years the fingerprint identification,
firearms identification, bite mark identification, and arson
investigation communities have attempted to improve the
reliability of their disciplines, but have failed to use
identification methods with solid scientific underpinnings.
Despite this shortcoming, most courts fail to discern the
difference between valid and invalid science, and are reluctant
to corral exaggerated expert testimony in certain fields.
However, the courts’ failures are understandable. In sharp
contrast to the storylines played out on popular television
shows, forensic science does not always clarify legal
ambiguities by leading straight to the culprit. In reality, law
wrestles with science. This is largely because law and science
have different cultures: law aims to stabilize society through
predictability, whereas science embraces change to understand
the natural world. Consequently, our understanding of forensic
science frequently changes, but the law responds slowly,
reluctantly, and often inconsistently.
I.

The Relationship Between Law and Science

Science helps the law understand the world in which legal
policy must operate.12 Science provides the law with a plethora
of facts, ranging from the parentage of a child and the side
effects of prescription drugs, to the workings of the Earth’s
structures, atomic bombs and modern industry. Thus, it seems
that law and science share a mutually convenient and benign
relationship: lawyers look to science for certainty in the face of
difficult legal questions, and science seemingly responds with
an answer.13
12. DAVID L. FAIGMAN, LEGAL ALCHEMY: THE USE AND MISUSE OF SCIENCE
LAW 26 (1999). Faigman argues that “without [science], legal policy is
literally blinded.” Id.
13. Alex R. Hess, Book Note, 9 J. HIGH TECH. L. 1 (2009) (reviewing
ROBIN FELDMAN, THE ROLE OF SCIENCE IN LAW (2000)).
IN THE
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However, there are problems at the intersection of law and
science. Law and science clash culturally because of their
different approaches to the world. As David Faigman puts it,
“[s]cience progresses while law builds slowly on precedent.
Science assumes that humankind is determined by some
combination of nature and nurture, while law assumes that
humankind can transcend these influences and exercise free
will. Science is a cooperative endeavor, while most legal
institutions operate on an adversary model.”14 These
differences may be superficial and stereotypical,15 but they are
not illusory. For example, Michael Saks argues that the
inclination of courts to simply cite supportive precedents has
“interfered with the courts’ inquiries about . . . purported
science.”16 Additionally, Robin Feldman points out that the law
is “too slow to adapt to the changing information available
through the advancements of science . . . .”17 Scholars also
argue that the adversarial trial system compounds these
problems by admitting evidence that does not adequately
represent the relevant scientific field.18 This is because,
ordinarily, scientists at the margins of their disciplines are
selected to testify due to their willingness to express extreme
views in their proponent’s favor.19
Although law and science take different approaches to the
world, there are a number of reasons to believe that science can
be a legitimate and reliable tool for the law. First, law and
science arguably seek the same thing—the truth—and, as
Faigman argues, law and science could “reconcile their cultural
peculiarities in a common goal.”20 That said, one must
acknowledge the “important differences between the quest for
truth in the courtroom and the quest for truth in the
laboratory.”21 The law seeks proof, which is not always the
same as the truth. As Susan Haack explains:
14. FAIGMAN, supra note 12, at 56.
15. Id.
16. Saks, supra note 3, at 1105.
17. Robin Feldman, Historic Perspectives on Law & Science, 2009 STAN.
TECH. L. REV. 1, 4.
18. See FAIGMAN, supra note 12, at 54.
19. Id. at 54.
20. Id. at 56.
21. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 596-97 (1993).
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[A] jury is asked to decide whether guilt or
liability has been established to the desired
degree of proof. This is a very special kind of
inquiry into a very special kind of proposition,
and is constrained not only by the demands of
evidence, but also by considerations of principle
and policy. . . . Moreover, the procedures of a
trial are quite unlike those of ordinary scientific
or historical inquiry . . . .22
Second, law is inherently evolutionary and adaptive.23 This
means it at least has the capacity to evolve, ensuring more
reliable scientific evidence enters the courtroom, despite some
scholars’ opinions that when the law borrows from science its
adaptive quality “breaks down.”24 However, one area in which
American law has shown its evolutionary and adaptive ability
is the development of legal frameworks governing the
admissibility of expert evidence. These developments will be
considered in Part II.
II. The Admissibility of Expert Evidence in American
Courtrooms
Anglo-American judges have summoned people with
specialized knowledge to aid in the legal process since the
thirteenth century.25 The first rule identified for governing the
admissibility of such evidence was the “commercial
marketplace test.”26 Under this test, “expert” knowledge was
22. Susan Haack, Inquiry and Advocacy, Fallibilism and Finality:
Culture and Inference in Science and the Law, 2 L. PROBABILITY & RISK 205,
206-07 (2003).
23. Feldman, supra note 17, at 5.
24. Id. at 103. Scholars argue legal rules and procedures hinder the
courts’ ability to evolve.
25. See Stephen Landsman, Of Witches, Madmen, and Product Liability:
An Historical Survey of the Use of Expert Testimony, 13 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 131,
134 (1995).
26. The term “commercial market place test” was only recently coined.
See generally David L. Faigman et al., Check Your Crystal Ball at the
Courthouse Door, Please: Exploring the Past, Understanding the Present, and
Worrying about the Future of Scientific Evidence, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 1799,
1803-05 (1994) (discussing the history and development of the commercial
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admissible if it had a commercial value and was beyond the
knowledge of the fact-finder.27 The problems with this regime28
were exposed in 1923 when James Frye attempted to introduce
into evidence the results of a systolic blood pressure deception
test.29 This attempt was problematic because although the
matter was beyond the fact-finder’s knowledge, the test had no
market value outside of the courtroom.30 Judge Van Orsdel
resolved the conflict by enacting a new standard of
admissibility, which demanded that a scientific principle or
discovery be “sufficiently established to have gained general
acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.”31
Frye shifted the burden of analyzing the reliability of a
theory from the judge to the relevant expert community.32
Supposedly, this shift made any admissible testimony more
credible.33 Despite its shortcomings,34 Frye was the dominant
standard for determining the admissibility of expert evidence
for over seventy years.35
marketplace test).
27. Saks, supra note 3, at 1073-74.
28. The fact that an area of knowledge has a commercial value does not
(and never has) automatically mean it is scientifically valid. See, e.g., id. at
1074:
The marketplace test had serious flaws, two of which
concern us here. First, the marketplace test was incapable
of distinguishing astrophysics from astrology. The market
values both of them. Commercial value, then, is not a
measure of scientific validity. A second problem was that
some fields have little or no life in any commercial
marketplace. Indeed, the fields that are the focus of this
Article have little or no function outside of their possible
courtroom utility. The courtroom is their marketplace.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
29. See Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
30. Sally Melnick, An Aura of Reliability: An Argument in Favor of
Daubert, 1 FLA. COASTAL L.J. 489, 491 (2000).
31. Frye, 293 F. at 1014 (emphasis added).
32. See Melnick, supra note 30, at 491.
33. Id.; see also United States v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741, 743-44 (D.C. Cir.
1974) (“The requirement of general acceptance in the scientific community
assures that those most qualified to assess the general validity of a scientific
method will have the determinative voice.”).
34. See, e.g., Melnick, supra note 30, at 492-93.
35. Maryellen Ryan, Comment, Ensuring Justice Prevails in the Wake of
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In 1993, after two decades of Congress’s failure to clarify
whether the 1975 Federal Rules of Evidence (“FRE”)
superseded Frye,36 in particular FRE 702,37 the United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari in Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. to clarify the matter.38 In Daubert, the
Supreme Court found that FRE 702 superseded Frye.39 In so
holding, the Justices charged the courts with ensuring the
Theresa Canavan's Case: A Proposal for Reform, 36 NEW ENG. L. REV. 479,
480 (2002). But see Saks, supra note 3, at 1076.
In actuality, the Frye corollary was so minor a variant that
it went unnoticed for decades. Indeed, Judge Van Orsdel
himself ignored [the Frye standard] in another landmark
scientific evidence case he handed down on the very same
day he issued the Frye opinion. Frye was not cited by a
single other court, federal or state, for a decade. During the
first quarter century after its publication, Frye was cited in
only eight federal cases and five state cases. That amounts
to one case every other year in the entire country. During its
second quarter century, it was cited fifty-four times in
federal cases and twenty-nine times in state cases. The Frye
test really was “discovered” only in the past few decades.
Consequently, in the 1980's Frye was being cited as much
each year as it had been in its first fifty years added
together.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
36. Craig M. Cooley & Gabriel S. Oberfield, Increasing Forensic
Evidence's Reliability and Minimizing Wrongful Convictions: Applying
Daubert Isn't the Only Problem, 43 TULSA L. REV. 285, 287 (2007); see also
Stephen A. Saltzburg, Questioning the Judicial Role in Expert Testimony in
Complex and Non-Complex Cases, 3 SEDONA CONF. J. 185, 186 (2002) (“The
Advisory Committee's Note, accompanying Rule 702 indicates that the
Committee knew that ‘[t]he rule is broadly phrased,’ and that the Committee
believed that there was no better test of admissibility than to ask whether
the testimony could assist the trier of fact.” (alteration in original)).
37. The wording of FED. R. EVID. 702 departed from Frye. See Frye v.
United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923); FED. R. EVID. 702.
38. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 582-85 (1993). In
that case, the Daubert family alleged that the prenatal drug ingested by the
mother, and manufactured by Merrell Dow, caused serious birth defects in
her two children. Merrell Dow proffered the testimony of a chemical exposure
expert, who found the drug was not a risk factor for human birth defects,
whereas the Daubert family presented eight experts who concluded the drug
could cause birth defects. The lower courts sided with Merrell Dow after
concluding the Dauberts’ experts did not satisfy Frye’s “general acceptance”
standard. Id.
39. Id. at 597-98.
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relevance and reliability of expert testimony,40 and directed
lower court judges to examine the principles and methodology
of proffered scientific evidence, not just acceptance in the
relevant scientific community.41 To assist the lower courts, the
Supreme Court created a flexible, factor-based approach to
analyze the reliability of expert testimony. These factors
include: (1) whether a method can or has been tested;42 (2) the
known or potential rate of error;43 (3) whether the methods
have been subjected to peer review;44 (4) whether there are
standards controlling the technique’s operation;45 and (5) the
general acceptance of the method within the relevant
community.46
A number of criticisms have been leveled at Daubert,47
which remains the leading standard for the admissibility of
expert evidence.48 First, Daubert forces judges to become
40. See id. at 591-92.
41. Id. at 592-93.
42. Id. at 593.
43. Id. at 594.
44. Id. at 593-94.
45. Id. at 594.
46. Id.
47. Lower courts struggled to interpret Daubert, causing the Supreme
Court to clarify its ruling in two subsequent cases. In Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner,
522 U.S. 136 (1997), the Court determined that an appellate court, reviewing
a trial court's decision to admit or exclude expert testimony under Daubert
should apply the “abuse of discretion” standard. In so holding, the Supreme
Court limited the role of appellate courts in deciding whether to admit or
exclude expert evidence, and emphasized that the main “gate-keeping” power
remained with the trial judge. In Kumho Tire v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137
(1999), the Justices held that Daubert applied to all expert testimony, not
just scientific testimony. This silenced claims that Daubert did not apply to
the soft sciences. The Justices also held that trial courts may consider the five
Daubert factors to the extent they are relevant. In other words, the Supreme
Court did not endorse strict application of the Daubert factors.
48. Note that Congress amended Rule 702 in 2000 to codify the “Daubert
Trilogy.” FED. R. EVID. 702 now reads,
[i]f scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will
assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to
determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by
knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may
testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise, if (1)
the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the
testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods,
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“amateur scientists.”49 Scholars argue that judges “do not think
like scientists” and therefore do not have the capacity to ensure
only reliable science enters the courtroom.50 As Saks notes:
Just as legal training teaches one the
intellectual skills to analyze legal problems,
scientific training teaches one how to analyze
empirical questions and proposed answers. This
places judges in a weak position to know what
questions need to be asked in order to test an
empirical claim or how to evaluate the data
offered in answer.51
Still, it is arguable that pre-existing mechanisms within the
legal process can help judges overcome this criticism. For
example, judges can use pre-trial conference authority to
narrow the disputed scientific issues; conduct pre-trial
hearings where the court can examine potential experts; and
appoint independent experts, special masters, and specially
trained law clerks.52 A less sympathetic view contends that
because trial courts are the principal consumer of scientific
expertise, judges should simply “learn to evaluate what they
are getting for their dollar.”53
A second criticism is that Daubert, and its progeny,
significantly (and inappropriately) tip the delicate balance of
power between judge and jury in favor of the judge when it
comes to evaluating expert testimony.54 If, however, one

and (3) the witness has applied the principles and methods
reliably to the facts of the case.
STAFF OF H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 111TH CONG., FEDERAL RULES OF
EVIDENCE 9 (Comm. Print 2010). Like Daubert and its progeny, Rule 702
forces courts to question the empirical underpinnings of all expert testimony
and to exclude opinions that are “connected to existing data only by the ipse
dixit of the expert.” Kumho, 526 U.S. at 157.
49. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 601 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
50. Saks, supra note 3, at 1136.
51. Id.
52. Joiner, 522 U.S. at 149-50 (Breyer, J., concurring).
53. FAIGMAN, supra note 12, at 64.
54. Ryan, supra note 35, at 491.
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subscribes to the view that the juror population has succumbed
to a “CSI Effect,”55 this criticism is perhaps diluted. As Shelton
describes:
It is widely perceived . . . that modern
juries give a great deal of weight to scientific
evidence. They complain that jurors today
demand more from the prosecution in the way of
scientific evidence and that they will wrongfully
acquit defendants when such evidence is not
presented. Most of the blame for these
expectations is heaped on a single television
show, CSI (and its spin-offs), to the degree that it
has become known, both in the popular media
and in legal circles, as the “CSI effect.”56
In partial support of this view,57 a study conducted by
55. Shelton, supra note 1, at 371.
56. Id.; see also Kimberlianne Podlas, “The CSI Effect”: Exposing the
Media Myth, 16 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 429, 433 (2006).
The best-known definition states that CSI creates
unreasonable expectations on the part of jurors, making it
more difficult for prosecutors to obtain convictions. The
second definition, which runs contrary to the first, refers to
the way that CSI raises the stature of scientific evidence to
virtual infallibility, thus making scientific evidence
impenetrable.
Id.
57. It should be noted that, overall, Shelton’s study (and studies
subsequent to it) found that jurors’ increased expectations and demands for
scientific evidence are not related to watching CSI or similar television
programs. Instead, Shelton found
[r]ather than any direct “CSI effect” from watching certain
types of television programs . . . these juror expectations of
and demands for scientific evidence are the result of broader
changes in popular culture related to advancements in both
technology and information distribution. Those broad and
pervasive changes in technology lead jurors to expect that
the prosecutor will obtain and present the scientific
evidence that technology has made possible. These
increased expectations and demands of jurors therefore
could be more accurately referred to as the tech effect.
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Shelton found that jurors “expect prosecutors to present
scientific evidence and that, especially in cases where the rest
of the evidence is circumstantial, they will demand scientific
evidence before they will return a verdict of guilty.”58 On the
other hand, a study by Podlas returned data that denied “the
existence of any negative effect of CSI on ‘not guilty’ verdicts. . .
. If anything, the data hints that, if there is any effect of CSI, it
is to exalt the infallibility of forensic evidence, favor the
prosecution, or pre-dispose jurors toward findings of guilt.”59
By inviting stakeholders in the criminal justice system to
take a new look at old scientific evidence, Daubert has made
many scientific evidence-related precedents vulnerable to
reconsideration and reversal.60 The identification methods
employed by many forensic sciences, including fingerprint
identification, firearms identification, bite mark identification,
and arson investigation, are among the most vulnerable.61 Part
III details the methods employed by these four disciplines,
which are allegedly open to Daubert challenges.

Shelton, Kim & Barak, supra note 4, at 368.
58. Shelton, supra note 1, at 372.
59. Podlas, supra note 56, at 465 (emphasis added). Despite this result,
Podlas advocates for stakeholders in the criminal justice system to tackle the
concept of the CSI Effect.
Unfortunately, notwithstanding the evidence disputing a
“CSI Effect,” if the public, the media, and the legal system
do not accept or learn of this “proof,” accusations of the “CSI
Effect” will continue. Ultimately, much like the unfounded
tort crisis, CSI horror stories of justice denied may drive
legal “reforms” when no reforms are needed or cause the
issue to improperly enter trial arguments. Consequently,
before the “CSI Effect” has time and media repetition to
embed itself into the psyche of the public and members of
the justice system, it should be exposed for what it is:
nothing more than fiction.
Id.
60. Saks, supra note 3, at 1072.
61. Id. Note that some commentators were skeptical about Daubert's
likely impact on forensic science. See, e.g., Randolph Jonakait, The Meaning
of Daubert and What it Means for Forensic Science, 15 Cardozo L. Rev. 2103
(1994).
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III. Methods and Mistakes of Identification: Fingerprint
Identification, Firearms Identification, Bite-Mark
Identification, and Arson Investigation
A. Fingerprint Identification
When a person’s hand (or foot) touches certain surfaces,
the ridges on their skin leave a printed impression on the
surface touched. For over a century, the practice of “matching”
a crime scene print to an inked suspect print, known as friction
ridge analysis, has gained universal acceptance.62 Proponents
of fingerprint identification make three crucial claims: (1) every
individual possesses a unique and permanent set of
fingerprints;63 (2) fingerprint examiners can identify the donor
of a crime scene print (“latent print”) “to the exclusion of all
others;”64 and (3) fingerprint identification is infallible and has
a zero, or close to zero, error rate.65 The most common method
of fingerprint identification in the United States is the
Analysis–Comparison–Evaluation–Verification
(“ACE–V”)
62. Saks, supra note 3, at 1101.
63. Nathan Benedict, Fingerprints and the Daubert Standard for
Admission of Scientific Evidence: Why Fingerprints Fail and a Proposed
Remedy, 46 ARIZ. L. REV. 519, 527 (2004).
64. Jacqueline McMurtrie, Swirls and Whorls: Litigating PostConviction Claims of Fingerprint Misidentification After the NAS Report,
2010 UTAH L. REV. 267, 273 (“The fingerprint literature suggests that
examiners testify as follows: Q: How sure are you that those two prints were
made by the same finger? A: Absolutely sure! I don't testify to probabilities.”)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
65. Id. at 273-74.
[T]he third premise of fingerprint identifications is one of
“infallibility.” Many in the latent fingerprint community
also testify that the ACE-V comparison method has a “zero
error rate.” They claim that when the method is used by
well-trained and experienced examiners, no errors are ever
made, so that the method itself is error free. Thus, the claim
is that erroneous identifications are only made by poorly
trained or inexperienced practitioners. In other words, the
“methodological” (sometimes called “scientific”) error rate is
zero while the “practitioner” (sometimes called “human”)
error rate is unknown.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
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method.66 To conduct an examination using this method, the
fingerprint examiner needs a latent print and a known print
(“suspect print”).67
“The analysis phase relies on a ‘qualitative and
quantitative’ assessment of friction ridge detail at three levels
of granularity: (1) ridge flow . . .; (2) individual ridge
examination . . .; and (3) . . . [an] examination of pores.”68 The
latent print is analyzed first, followed by the suspect print.69
“The comparison phase involves a side-by-side observation” of
both the latent print and the suspect print.70 The examiner
observes the “friction ridge detail to determine if the details
match in similarity, sequence, and spatial relationship.”71 No
set number of similarities (i.e., “points”) are indicative of a
“match.”72 The evaluation phase “requires the examiner to form
a conclusion about the prints”: (1) the prints may match
(“individualization” or “identification”); (2) the prints may not
match (“exclusion”); or (3) the results may be inconclusive.73
The comparison and evaluation phases both require the
examiner to exercise independent judgment, which is based on

66. See Commonwealth v. Patterson, 840 N.E.2d 12, 14 n.2 (Mass. 2005).
67. United States v. Aman, 748 F. Supp. 2d 531, 539 (E.D. Va. 2010).
68. Id. “The first level of detail can be used to exclude but not identify, a
print, while a combination of the second and third levels of detail may allow
for either identification or exclusion. If either . . . print is unsuitable for
examination, the analysis ends.” Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. “[D]ifferences in the fingerprints do not necessarily end the
analysis; rather, the examiner must determine whether the dissimilarity is
explainable given pressure differences, surface texture, print medium (e.g.,
ink, sweat, or blood), and other expected variations.” Id.
72. Id.
No set number of similarities—sometimes known as
“points”—indicates a “match,” since it is both the quantity
and quality of similarities that allow for identification.
Likewise, the number of explained dissimilarities—that is,
dissimilarities believed to be the result of expected
variations—is not dispositive either for or against finding a
match.
Id.
73. Id.
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individual training and experience.74 In the final phase,
verification, “a second examiner is provided the same prints
and checks the work of the first examiner.”75
However, fingerprint identification is not error-free. The
most high profile example of a debunked fingerprint “match” is
in the case of Brandon Mayfield.76 In March 2004, the Madrid
bombings killed 192 people and injured thousands.77 A bag of
detonators found near the explosion site contained a
fingerprint.78 Three FBI examiners concluded that the print
was an “[one hundred] percent positive identification” of
Brandon Mayfield, an Oregon attorney.79 After two weeks in
prison, Mayfield was released due to an erroneous
identification.80 An Algerian suspect’s DNA was found in an
inculpatory area,81 and his prints closely “matched” those found
on the bag of detonators at the explosion site.82
B. Firearms Identification
American courts have admitted firearms identification
evidence for over eighty years.83 Investigators regularly seek to
identify a particular gun as the source of suspect
ammunition.84 When the hard metal of an internal part of a
gun connects with the softer metal of the ammunition, the gun
74. Id.
75. Id. Notably, the second examiner is aware of the first examiner's
conclusion.
76. Professor Simon Cole has labeled the Mayfield error as “probably the
most highly publicized fingerprint error ever exposed.” Simon A. Cole, More
than Zero: Accounting for Error in Latent Fingerprint Identification, 95 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 985, 985 (2005).
77. Elaine Sciolino, Bombings in Madrid: The Attack; 10 Bombs Shatter
Trains in Madrid, Killing 192, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12, 2004, at A1.
78. Cooley & Oberfield, supra note 36, at 325.
79. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
80. Susan Schmidt, Oregon Lawyer's Status Remains Murky, WASH.
POST, May 22, 2004, at A2.
81. Tomas Alex Tizon et al., Critics Galvanized by Oregon Lawyer's
Case, L.A. TIMES, May 22, 2004, at A13.
82. See Schmidt, supra note 80.
83. See 4 DAVID L. FAIGMAN ET AL., MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE
LAW AND SCIENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY § 35:1, at 642-43 (2011-2012 ed.
2011).
84. Shelton, supra note 1, at 335.
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makes a “tool-mark” on the ammunition.85 Tool-marks can be
divided into class, sub-class, and individual characteristics.86
Class characteristics are the distinctively designed features of
a class of tools, and are present on every tool in that class.87
Individual characteristics are unique to a particular tool, and
consist of random, microscopic imperfections and irregularities
on the tool’s surface.88 Sub-class characteristics straddle the
line between class and individual characteristics.89 These
characteristics arise when manufacturing processes create
batches of tools that are similar to each other, but that are
distinct from other tools of the same class.90 Firearms
identification is premised on the notion that a weapon leaves
unique tool-marks on the ammunition it fires, and those marks
are reproduced each time the weapon is discharged.91 Thus,
many firearms examiners believe they have the ability to
conclude that a particular gun fired a particular bullet to the
“exclusion of all other[s] . . . .”92
However, examiners can be very conflicted in their views of
the same evidence. For example, during a 1989 investigation of
several prostitution-related murders, Rickey Ross, a Sheriff’s
Deputy, was arrested for soliciting and accompanying a
prostitute.93 In three of the murder cases, the offender shot the
prostitutes with a handgun.94 Two police officers concluded that
85. When a gun is fired, two distinct types of tool-marks may be created:
striations and impressions. Striations are similar to small scratches, and are
most often produced on the bullet as it passes through the gun barrel.
Impressions usually resemble dimples or craters, and are typically produced
on the cartridge as it comes into contact with the various internal parts of the
firing chamber (e.g. the firing pin, breach face, extractor, and ejector). Adina
Schwartz, Challenging Firearms and Toolmark Identification—Part One,
CHAMPION MAG., Oct. 2008, at 10, 12.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. See id.
90. Id. Sub-class characteristics cannot be said to be individual
characteristics because they are shared by more than one tool. Nor can they
be said to be class characteristics because they are not shared by every tool in
that class.
91. See Shelton, supra note 1, at 335-36.
92. Schwartz, supra note 85, at 14.
93. Cooley & Oberfield, supra note 36, at 338-39.
94. Id. at 339.
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Ross’s firearm and “no other weapon” could have discharged
the fatal bullets.95 Ross was charged with murdering three
prostitutes, but was later released when three other experts
concluded that the evidence “overwhelmingly exclude[d]” Ross’s
firearm as the offending weapon.96
In 1998, the Association of Firearms and Toolmark
Examiners (“AFTE”)97 developed a protocol detailing when an
examiner may reach a certain conclusion (“AFTE Protocol”).98
Presently, the AFTE Protocol is the industry standard by
which examiners conduct their examinations. Under the AFTE
Protocol, an examiner may make one of the following four
conclusions: (1) identification, (2) inconclusive, (3) elimination,
or (4) unsuitable for comparison.99 To make an “identification”
(i.e., a “match”), there must be “sufficient agreement” between
the tool-marks present on ammunition found at a crime scene
and a test cartridge fired from a suspect weapon.100
95. Id. at 338.
96. Id. at 339 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
97. The AFTE is an international organization of firearms and toolmark
examiners and is the leading professional organization in the field.
98. Ass’n of Firearms & Toolmark Exam’rs, Theory of Identification as It
Relates to Toolmarks, 30 ASS’N FIREARMS & TOOLMARK EXAMINERS J., no. 1,
Winter 1998, at 86. The AFTE Protocol is meant to be a practical application
of the AFTE’s Theory of Identification.
99. Id. at 86-87. These conclusions apply to the identification of a
weapon as a whole, not simply to the individual marks an examiner may be
comparing. That is, the AFTE’s protocol does not anticipate conclusions that,
for instance, the firing pin marks are Identifications, the breach face marks
are Inconclusive, and the ejector marks are Eliminations. Such a
schizophrenic application of the protocol would be of no use to a jury. Rather,
the protocol anticipates that the combination of the marks examined will
cumulatively reveal which conclusion the examiner may reach regarding the
weapon itself. A conclusion is “Inconclusive” (e.g. a particular weapon may, or
may not, have made a particular mark) when there is: “[s]ome agreement of
individual characteristics and all discernable class characteristics, but
insufficient for identification,” Id. at 87; or “[a]greement of all discernable
class characteristics without agreement or disagreement of individual
characteristics due to an absence, insufficiency, or lack of reproducibility,”
Id.; or “[a]greement of all discernible class characteristics and disagreement
of individual characteristics, but insufficient for elimination.” Id. An
“elimination” (i.e., a particular weapon did not make a particular mark) is
made when there is “[s]ignificant disagreement of discernable class
characteristics and/or individual characteristics.” Id. Finally, where the
marks presented are “unsuitable for comparison,” the examiner must make
no conclusion. Id.
100. The AFTE Theory of Identification allows an examiner to conclude
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C. Bite Mark Identification
Bite-mark identification is a specialized subset within the
broader discipline of forensic odontology.101 In a criminal case,
forensic odontologists “compare a suspect’s dentition with a
latent mark left in the victim’s flesh, or in some edible
substance found at the scene of the crime,” to determine
whether the two samples “match.”102 “The basic premise
underlying bite mark forensic evidence is that human dentition
is unique . . . .”103 Thus, bite mark evidence is considered a
method of individualization. Since 1980, nearly all American
states have admitted bite mark evidence.104
The American Board of Forensic Odontology (“ABFO”)
developed “the first standardized guidelines for the collection
and analysis of bite mark evidence.”105 According to these
guidelines, “[t]he standard comparison technique . . . is to
match a photograph or model of the bite mark to a template of
the suspect’s dentition through an overlay technique at the
same scale.”106 “The ABFO has created a scoring guide to
evaluate the strength of the comparison. Points are awarded
that a particular tool made a particular mark when there is “sufficient
agreement” between the tool and the mark. “Sufficient agreement” exists
when “the agreement is of a quantity and quality that the likelihood another
tool could have made the mark is so remote as to be considered a practical
impossibility.” AFTE Criteria for Identification Committee, Theory of
Identification, Range of Striae Comparison Reports and Modified Glossary
Definitions – an AFTE Criteria for Identification Committee Report, 24 ASS’N
FIREARMS & TOOLMARK EXAMINERS J. no. 2, April 1992, at 336-40.
101. Saks, supra note 3, at 1119.
102. Id.
103. Shelton, supra note 1, at 346. Many courts have accepted the basic
concept of dental uniqueness. See Erica Beecher-Monas, Reality Bites: The
Illusion of Science in Bite-Mark Evidence, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 1369, 1372
(2008).
104. See 5 DAVID L. FAIGMAN ET AL., MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE
LAW AND SCIENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY § 37:4, at 6 (2011-2012 ed. 2011).
105. Steven Weigler, Bite Mark Evidence: Forensic Odontology and the
Law, 2 HEALTH MATRIX 303, 307 (1992). “In its statement of purpose, [ABFO]
noted that ‘careful use of these guidelines in bite mark analysis will enhance
the quality of the investigation and the conclusions.’” Id. at 307-08. The
guidelines advise experts in relation to “the description of the bite mark,
collection of the evidence from the victim, collection of the evidence from the
suspect, and the analysis of the evidence.” Id.
106. Id. at 309 (footnotes omitted).
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for various matches in gross dental anatomy, tooth position,
and intradental features.”107
ABFO guidelines do not protect all criminal defendants. In
1991, Ray Krone was convicted of murdering a bartender who
was found with a bite mark on her breast. Prior to trial, a FBI
odontologist told investigators that it “‘could not have been
clearer’” that Krone was not the donor of the bite mark.108
However, at trial, the state’s expert testified that there was a
“definite match” between Krone’s teeth and the bite mark.109
The state’s expert also misstated some relevant statistics while
testifying: “the possibilities of two teeth being in the same
position, it would be 150 times 150, whatever that is. Maybe
1200 or something like that.”110 In 2002, DNA evidence
exonerated Krone and identified the real culprit.111

107. Id. (footnotes omitted).
A 1986 study published in the Journal of Forensic Sciences
reports a high degree of reliability associated with the use of
the scoring guide. However, in 1988, the authors of the 1986
study seemed to recant their initial optimism when they
stated: Subsequent discussion and review has led the
authors to the conclusion that much more work and
consideration will be needed before a stable and accurate
index is developed that can be widely applied. . . . [T]he
authors' present recommendation is that all odontologists
await the results of further research before relying on
precise point counts in evidentiary proceedings.
The scoring guidelines are merely a guide and should not be relied upon
exclusively. Id. (alteration in original) (footnotes omitted).
108. BRANDON L. GARRETT, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT: WHERE CRIMINAL
PROSECUTIONS GO WRONG 103-05 (1st ed. 2011) (quoting Robert Nelson,
About
Face,
PHX.
NEW
TIMES,
Apr.
21,
2005,
http://www.phoenixnewtimes.com/2005-04-21/feature/about-face/).
109. Id. at 104 (internal quotation marks omitted).
110. Id. at 103 (internal quotation marks omitted).
111. Id. at 103-04.
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D. Arson Investigation
There are two types of fires: accidental fires and incendiary
fires.112 The latter are treated as arson.113 Arson prosecutions
often depend on whether the prosecution can show the
presence of a chemical accelerant at the scene of the fire.114
Fire investigators use chemical tests and their training and
experience to identify alleged physical hallmarks of arson.115
These hallmarks include pour patterns, “spider-web” glass,
brown stains on the floor, and “V” shaped soot marks.116 Fire
investigators often testify to observing these hallmarks in
arson cases.117
This practice has its limitations, however. In 1987, Ernest
Willis was sentenced to death for purposely setting a fire that
resulted in two deaths. The prosecution’s case rested primarily
on arson experts who testified to identifying a number of arson
hallmarks at the crime scene.118 Willis maintained that he was
innocent.119 No accelerant was detected on Willis’s clothes, and
prosecutors “never produced any evidence regarding the type of
accelerant used to start the fire . . . .”120 In August 2004, the
district court, taking into account expert evidence discrediting
the validity of the arson hallmarks, granted Willis’s writ of
habeas corpus.121 The state declined to appeal or retry Willis,
and Willis was freed from death row in October 2004.122

112. See Bruce L. Ottley, Beyond the Crime Laboratory: The
Admissibility of Unconfirmed Forensic Evidence in Arson Cases, 36 NEW ENG.
J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 263, 269 (2010).
113. Id.
114. Id. at 266.
115. David Grann, Trial By Fire–Did Texas Execute an Innocent Man?,
THE
NEW
YORKER,
Sept.
7,
2009,
available
at
http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2009/09/07/090907fa_fact_grann.
116. Id.
117. See Id.
118. It was said that burn patterns and the degree of burning indicated
that a flammable liquid was poured on the floor of the house. See Cooley &
Oberfield, supra note 36, at 329–31.
119. Willis v. Texas, 785 S.W.2d 378, 380 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989),
overruled by Estrada v. Texas, 313 S.W.3d 274 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010).
120. Id. at 330 (internal quotation marks omitted).
121. Id.
122. Id. at 331.
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The National Fire Protection Agency (“NFPA”) produced a
guide for fire and explosion Investigations (“NFPA 921”).123
NFPA 921 recommends that investigators use the well-known
“scientific method” of generating and testing hypotheses to
determine the cause of a fire.124 The NFPA 921 guide details
how fire patterns, burn damage, and other evidence can be
used to explain the cause and origin of a fire, but it also
requires investigators to exclude nine non-arson causes for
certain fires before reaching a conclusion that the fire was
incendiary.125
The methods employed in the fields of fingerprint
identification, firearms identification, bite mark identification,
and arson investigation all assist the criminal justice process
by providing expert knowledge capable of identifying the
perpetrator of a crime to the exclusion of all others. DNA
exonerations and questionable prosecutions expose the flaws of
these disciplines: they are not underpinned by the scientific
method; they have unknown error-rates; they rely heavily on
subjective and experience-based evaluations, which can widely
diverge; they allow for overstated conclusions; and they are
governed by inadequate standards. These weaknesses fuelled
the school of thought that these disciplines are inadmissible
under Daubert.126 This school of thought intensified when the
NAS produced its 2009 report, Strengthening Forensic Science
in the United States: A Path Forward. The report’s findings will
be considered in Part IV.

123. NFPA 921 is a three-hundred-page manual originally published in
1992 and updated periodically thereafter. As the manual itself explains,
NFPA 921 was developed by the Technical Committee on Fire Investigations,
which includes dozens of fire investigators from local, state, and national
agencies. As the list of committee members suggests, and as confirmed by
Robbins's own testimony, NFPA 921 has been peer-reviewed and is generally
accepted in the community of fire investigators. The NFPA 921 has been
widely disseminated in the field of fire investigation. United States v. Aman,
748 F. Supp. 2d 531, 535 (E.D. Va. 2010).
124. This methodology consists of seven steps: “(1) identify the problem;
(2) define the problem; (3) collect data; (4) analyze the data; (5) develop a
hypothesis; (6) test the hypothesis; and (7) following any repeated rounds of
refining and testing the hypothesis, select the final conclusion.” Id. at 535.
125. Id. at 535-36.
126. Jennifer L. Mnookin et al., The Need for a Research Culture in the
Forensic Sciences, 58 UCLA L. REV. 725, 726-27 (2011).
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IV. The Findings of the National Academy of Sciences:
Strengthening Forensic Science in the United States: A Path
Forward (2009)
Congress recognized the need for significant improvements
in the forensic science system, and in 2005 commissioned the
National Academy of Sciences to explore these problems. The
purpose of the Academy, one of the world’s premier sources of
independent, expert advice on scientific issues, was to report on
the past, present, and future use of forensic science in
America.127 The Academy spent two years collaborating with
legal and scientific scholars and practitioners.128 It heard over
eighty witnesses during sixteen days of testimony.129 The
Academy issued a report containing its findings in 2009.
The report was billed as a “‘blockbuster’ that [would
overhaul] the legal landscape regarding forensic evidence,”130
addressed the veracity of numerous forensic disciplines, and
made many eye-opening findings. The report concluded that
the forensic science system had “serious problems,”131 faced
many challenges,132 and was accountable for multiple wrongful

127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

NAS REPORT, supra note 2, at xix.
Id. at xix-xx.
Id. at 2.
McMurtrie, supra note 64, at 267.
NAS REPORT, supra note 2, at xx.
In considering the testimony and evidence that was
presented to the committee, what surprised us the most was
the consistency of the message that we heard: The forensic
science system, encompassing both research and practice,
has serious problems that can only be addressed by a
national commitment to overhaul the current structure that
supports the forensic science community in this country.
This can only be done with effective leadership at the
highest levels of both federal and state governments,
pursuant to national standards, and with a significant
infusion of federal funds.

Id.
132. Id. at 4-5. These challenges range from the lack of mandatory
standardization, certification, and accreditation to problems associated with
the interpretation of forensic evidence, to the need for research to establish
limits and measures of performance. Id. at 6.
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convictions.133 On the basis of the evidence before it, the NAS
concluded, inter alia, that (1) “with the exception of nuclear
DNA analysis . . . no forensic method has been rigorously
shown to have the capacity to consistently, and with a high
degree of certainty, demonstrate a connection between evidence
and a specific individual or source”134 and (2) the existing legal
framework governing the admissibility of forensic evidence in
the United States was inadequate for resolving the problems
identified.135 Additionally, the report made some specific
findings regarding fingerprint identification, firearms
identification, bite mark identification, and arson investigation.
A. Fingerprint Identification
The NAS Report acknowledged that “friction ridge analysis
has served as a valuable tool, both to identify the guilty and to
exclude the innocent,” and gave some support to the discipline’s

133. Id. at 4.
Those advances [DNA evidence testing], however,
also have revealed that, in some cases, substantive
information and testimony based on faulty forensic science
analyses may have contributed to wrongful convictions of
innocent people. This fact has demonstrated the potential
danger of giving undue weight to evidence and testimony
derived from imperfect testing and analysis. Moreover,
imprecise or exaggerated expert testimony has sometimes
contributed to the admission of erroneous or misleading
evidence.
Id.
134. Id. at 7.
135. Id. at 85.
The report finds that the existing legal regime—including
the rules governing the admissibility of forensic evidence,
the applicable standards governing appellate review of trial
court decisions, the limitations of the adversary process, and
judges and lawyers who often lack the scientific expertise
necessary to comprehend and evaluate forensic evidence—is
inadequate to the task of curing the documented ills of the
forensic science disciplines.
Id.
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ability to engage in individualization.136 Due to the amount of
detail available in friction ridges, NAS opined “[it’s] plausible
that a careful comparison of two impressions can accurately
discern whether or not they had a common source.”137 The
report agreed that some scientific evidence supports the
presumption that friction ridge patterns are unique and remain
unchanged throughout a lifetime.138
However, the report also found that the discipline was not
“properly” underpinned.139 The NAS Report’s criticism spanned
four areas. First, NAS found that ACE-V is not “specific enough
to qualify as a validated method” because it “does not guard
against bias; is too broad to ensure repeatability and
transparency; and does not guarantee that two analysts
following it will obtain the same results.”140 Thus, following
ACE-V did not mean that one was “proceeding in a scientific
manner or producing reliable results.”141 Second, NAS thought
examiners needed to better document their analysis.142 Third,
NAS opined that claims of a zero error-rate are clearly
“unrealistic.”143 Fourth, NAS determined that more research is
needed into ridge patterns and distribution, discriminating
values and items that affect the quality of latent prints.144

136. Id. at 142.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 143-44.
139. Id. at 144.
140. Id. at 142.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 143 (“Better documentation is needed of each step in the
ACE-V process or its equivalent. At the very least, sufficient documentation
is needed to reconstruct the analysis, if necessary.”).
143. Id.
144. Id. at 144-45. The NAS Report acknowledged that “additional
research is also needed into ridge flow and crease pattern distribution on the
hands and feet . . . , [and] more research is needed regarding the
discriminating value of the various ridge formations and clusters of ridge
formations.” Id. at 144.
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B. Firearms Identification
The NAS Report found that class characteristics can be
“helpful in narrowing the pool of tools that may have left a
distinctive mark,”145 and that individual characteristics “might,
in some cases, be distinctive enough to suggest one particular
source.”146 However, overall, the report concluded that “the
scientific knowledge base for tool mark and firearms analysis is
fairly limited.”147 In order to make the process of
individualization more precise and repeatable, the report
concluded “additional studies should be performed.”148 It
further concluded that the AFTE Protocol was not defined in a
sufficiently precise way for examiners to follow, particularly in
relation to when an examiner can “match” two samples.149 The
report berated the protocol, stating “[t]his AFTE document,
which is the best guidance available for the field of tool mark
identification, does not even consider, let alone address,
questions regarding variability, reliability, repeatability, or the
145. Id. at 154.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 155.
148. Id. at 154. Some studies have been performed to consider the
degree of similarity that can be found between marks made by different tools
and the variability in marks made by individual tool.
149. Id. at 155.
As noted above, AFTE has adopted a theory of
identification, but it does not provide a specific protocol. It
says that an examiner may offer an opinion that a specific
tool or firearm was the source of a specific set of toolmarks…when ‘sufficient agreement’ exists in the pattern of
two sets of marks.
Id. The standards define agreement as significant
when it exceeds the best agreement demonstrated between
tool marks known to have been produced by different tools
and is consistent with the agreement demonstrated by tool
marks known to have been produced by the same tool. The
meaning of “exceeds the best agreement” and “consistent
with” are not specified, and the examiner is expected to
draw on his or her own experience.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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number of correlations needed to achieve a given degree of
confidence.”150
C. Bite Mark Identification
The NAS Report found that “it is reasonable to assume
that the process [bite mark identification] can sometimes
reliably exclude suspects.”151 However, the report firmly
rejected the notion that experts can identify a person, by their
bite mark, “to the exclusion of all others.”152 The NAS found
that there is no scientific basis for such claims153 and was
concerned by the controversial nature of bite mark
identification,154 the high rate of false-positive results,155 and
the fact that “experts diverge widely in their evaluations of the
same bite-mark evidence.”156 The report acknowledged that the
ABFO guidelines attempt to standardize experts’ analysis, but
criticized the guidelines for not offering scientific criteria for
determining when a bite mark can be related to a person’s
dentition and with what degree of probability.157
D. Arson Analysis
The NAS Report found that conclusions by fire
investigators that a particular fire was arson, on the basis of
rules of thumb, are not well founded.158 The report stated:
Despite the paucity of research, some arson
investigators continue to make determinations
about whether or not a particular fire was set.
However, according to testimony presented to the
committee, many of the rules of thumb that are
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
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typically assumed to indicate that an accelerant
was used (e.g., “alligatoring” of wood, specific
char patterns) have been shown not to be true.
Experiments should be designed to put arson
investigations on a more solid scientific
footing.159
To help tackle the various shortcomings of forensic science,
the NAS Report made thirteen recommendations, which
included the creation of an entirely “new, strong, and
independent” federal agency – The National Institute of
Forensic Science (“NFIS”).160 NFIS would objectively oversee
and regulate the practices of forensic science to ensure the
development of rigorous research to determine the capabilities
and the limits of forensic science.161 NFIS would have “no ties
to the past,”162 but “the authority and resources to implement a
fresh agenda designed to address the problems” identified in
the 2009 NAS Report.163
The Academy recommended that one area NFIS should
focus upon is “developing programs to improve understanding
of the forensic science disciplines and their limitations within
legal systems.”164 Whether this envisions NFIS playing a role
in improving the existing legal frameworks that govern the
admissibility of forensic evidence, is unclear. One thing that is
clear, however, is that American courts need help in evaluating
forensic science. Despite the fact that (1) Daubert demands
courts to ensure that forensic evidence rests on a reliable
foundation, (2) scores of DNA exonerations have exposed the
unreliability of various other forensic disciplines and
examiners, and (3) the NAS has confirmed that the forensic
science system has serious problems, many American courts
are still failing to discern the differences between valid and
invalid science. Despite the fact that our understanding of
forensic science is changing, the law is responding slowly,
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.

Id. (footnotes omitted).
Id. at 18, 19-33.
Id. 19-22.
Id. at 18.
Id.
Id. at 19-20 (Recommendation 1(h)).
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reluctantly and often inconsistently. A snapshot of cases
involving fingerprint identification, firearms identification, bite
mark identification, and arson investigation, between 2000 and
2011, support this view. These cases are critically evaluated in
Part V.
V. A Critical Survey of American Criminal Court Responses
to Legal Challenges Concerning Fingerprint Identification,
Firearms Identification, Bite Mark Identification, and Arson
Investigation Between 2000 and 2011
A. Fingerprint Identification
In 2002, Judge Pollak of the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania surprised the
American criminal justice system. In United States v. Llera
Plaza (Llera Plaza I), after a Daubert review, Judge Pollak held
that “no expert witness for any party will be permitted to
testify that, in the opinion of the witness, a particular latent
print is—or is not—the print of a particular person.”165 Judge
Pollak’s ruling was the first “successful” defense challenge to
fingerprint identification evidence.166 However, as Lawson
explains, “Judge Pollak’s ruling was not radical. Pollak appears
to be the first judge to fully analyze the scientific validity of
fingerprints under the true tenets of the Daubert-Kumho
standard. . . . [T]he expert’s ultimate conclusion regarding
identity . . . lacked scientific validity.”167
Llera Plaza I was short-lived, however. Weeks later, Judge
Pollak reversed his decision.168 The reversal (Llera Plaza II)
was based on Judge Pollak’s finding that the FBI’s ACE–V
process was “essentially indistinguishable” from that of

165. United States v. Llera Plaza (Llera Plaza I), Nos. 98-cr-362-10, 98cr-362-11, 98-cr-362-12, 2002 WL 27305 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 7, 2002), vacated and
superseded, 188 F. Supp. 2d 549 (E.D. Pa. 2002).
166. Tamara F. Lawson, Can Fingerprints Lie?: Re-Weighing Fingerprint
Evidence in Criminal Jury Trials, 31 AM. J. CRIM. L. 1, 34-35 (2003).
167. Id. at 36.
168. United States v. Llera Plaza (Llera Plaza II), 188 F. Supp. 2d 549
(E.D. Pa. 2002) (vacating and superseding the prior decision upon
reconsideration).
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England’s New Scotland Yard.169 Judge Pollak bowed to
precedent, stating “to postpone present in-court utilization of
this ‘bedrock forensic identifier’ pending such research would
be to make the best the enemy of the good.”170
Soon after Llera Plaza I and Llera Plaza II, the Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals considered United States v. Crisp.171
Crisp was convicted of a bank robbery based in part on expert
testimony that his right palm had produced a print recovered
from a confession note.172 Crisp challenged the admission of the
testimony under Daubert.173 The majority rejected Crisp’s
claims. They found that precedent favored admission174: the
principles underlying fingerprint identification bore the
“imprimatur of a strong general acceptance;”175 the discipline
had adequate standards controlling its operation because
“fingerprint analysts are held to a consistent ‘points and
characteristics’ approach to identification,”176 and examiners
undergo proficiency tests;177 and there was testimony that the
discipline had an “essentially zero” error-rate.178 The majority
conceded that “further research . . . and the development of
even more consistent professional standards is desirable,” but
found, “‘[v]igorous cross-examination, presentation of contrary
evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of proof are the
traditional and appropriate means of attacking shaky but
admissible evidence.’”179 Notably, however, studies have
rejected the idea that cross-examination cures “shaky”
evidence:

169. Id. at 575-76.
170. Id. at 572.
171. United States v. Crisp, 324 F.3d 261 (4th Cir. 2003).
172. Id. at 265.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 268.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 269.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 269-70 (quoting Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc, 509 U.S.
579, 596 (1993)) (alteration in original).
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For example, in mock jury studies about
the effectiveness of cross-examination, it
apparently made little difference whether the
defense challenged the expert testimony;
whether the defense pointed out in cross
examination that the expert’s conclusions were
inconsistent with prior research and that the
expert had not followed standard methodology;
whether the defense not only cross-examined the
prosecution expert, but also put on its own
expert. Although the jurors discussed the expert
evidence in their deliberations, and although
there was a strong correlation between the
prosecution expert’s testimony and the jury’s
verdict preferences, the results did not vary
among the first three conditions.180
In his dissent, Judge Michael was also cautious about the
power of cross-examination, stating that “adversarial testing
simply means that the defense lawyer cross-examines the
government’s expert. That, I concede, is important, but it only
goes part way. In most criminal cases . . . the defendant does
not have access to an independent expert who could review the
analyses and conclusions of the prosecution’s expert.”181 This
view is shared by Saks: “The maldistribution of forensic
scientists so favors the prosecution that the defense has little
access to any, which prevents the adversary process from
working, as intended, to expose error.”182
Judge Michael found that the fingerprint evidence (in
Crisp’s case) failed Daubert review.183 He found that there was
no record of testing on the reliability of fingerprint
identification,184 that peer review in the fingerprint community
did not “prompt critique or reanalysis by other scientists,”185
and that the error-rate provided to the court was based on
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol33/iss1/6

Beecher-Monas, supra note 103, at 1407 (footnotes omitted).
Crisp, 324 F.3d at 273 (Michael, J., dissenting).
Saks, supra note 3, at 1093.
Crisp, 324 F.3d at 272 (Michael, J., dissenting).
Id. at 273-74.
Id. at 274.
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assumption and not scientific studies.186 Judge Michael also
found that the discipline’s controlling standards were not
universal.187 He was troubled by examiners’ subjective
approach to determining a match between a latent print and a
suspect print,188 and the lack of clarity with regards to whether
proficiency tests represented real life conditions.189 Because the
fingerprint examination community had not been sufficiently
challenged internally or externally, Judge Michael opined that
the technique was not generally accepted in the scientific
community.190 With regard to precedent, Judge Michael
concluded, “[t]he history of fingerprint identification and the
dogged certainty of its examiners are insufficient to show that
the technique is reliable.”191 As such, Judge Michael’s dissent
added to the courts’ recent unease about the reliability of
fingerprint evidence.
In 2004, Byron Mitchell challenged the admission of
fingerprint evidence that connected him to getaway car used in
a robbery. In United States v. Mitchell (Mitchell I),192 the
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit found that
fingerprint evidence passed “Daubert muster,”193 but applied a
different approach to Llera Plaza II and Crisp. First, the court
focused on the notion that the premises of fingerprint
identification were “testable,” not whether they were actually
underpinned by scientific testing.194 The court was persuaded
that the reliability of fingerprint evidence had been tested by
one hundred years of experience.195 Second, the court
considered peer review in the context of whether the
“verification” step of ACE–V constitutes effective peer review,
as well as publication. The court heard evidence that
“verification” was not always anonymous and that fingerprint
examiners had “developed an ‘occupational norm of unanimity’
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.

Id.
Id. at 275.
Id.
Id. at 274-75.
Id. at 276.
Id. at 278.
United States v. Mitchell, 365 F.3d 215 (3d Cir. 2004).
Id. at 219.
Id. at 235-38.
Id. at 238.
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that strongly discouraged the verifying examiner from
challenging the identification made by the initial examiner.”196
With that in mind, the court found “[l]ooking at the entire
picture, the ACE–V verification step may not be peer review in
its best form, but, on balance, the peer review factor does favor
admission.”197 The court found that the “publication facet of
peer review is not a strong factor, and neither reinforces nor
detracts from our conclusion that the peer review factor favors
admission.”198 Third, the court found that despite the fact an
“error rate [had] not been precisely quantified . . . the absence
of significant numbers of false positives in practice,” and the
absence of false positives in two recent surveys meant the
discipline’s error rate “strongly” favored admission.199 Unlike
past cases, however, the court found that the discipline was
lacking with regards to controlling standards.200 The court
opined that the ACE-V method was “insubstantial” in
comparison to the “elaborate and exhaustively refined
standards found in many scientific and technical disciplines.”201
196.
197.
198.
199.

Id. at 238-39.
Id. at 239.
Id.
Id. at 241.
We therefore accept that the error rate has been
sufficiently identified to count this factor as strongly
favoring admission of the evidence. The error rate has not
been precisely quantified, but the various methods of
estimating the error rate all suggest that it is very low. This
follows from three pieces of evidence we identify above as
favoring the government: (1) the absence of significant
numbers of false positives in practice (despite the enormous
incentive to discover them), (2) the absence of false positives
in the FBI's state agency survey, and (3) the statistical
computations based on the 50/50 experiment.

Id.
200. Id.
201. Id. The court also found the discipline to be “generally accepted.”
Thus we consider as one factor in the Daubert analysis
whether fingerprint identification is generally accepted
within the forensic identification community. The answer is
yes, as demonstrated by the results of the FBI's survey of
state agencies. … Mitchell's only argument with respect to
this factor is that there is no scientific community that
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In 2005, a Superior Court in Massachusetts found that the
ACE-V method was “sufficiently reliable to admit expert
opinion testimony regarding” a fingerprint match.202 Despite
this typical ruling, the case of Commonwealth v. Patterson,
shows a court restricting the acceptance of fingerprint
identification evidence. In Patterson, an examiner used the
ACE-V method “to determine that four latent impressions
found on the victim’s vehicle were left by [the defendant].”203
The examiner could not match any single latent impression to
its “allegedly corresponding finger,” so based his testimony on
the “cumulative similarities between the impressions and their
corresponding fingers. The examiner opined that the four
impressions could be analyzed collectively because they were
simultaneous impressions, that is, impressions of multiple
fingers made by the same hand at the same time.”204 The court
held that application of ACE-V to simultaneous impressions
did not satisfy Daubert, stating:
the Commonwealth needed to establish more
than the general reliability of latent fingerprint
identification. It needed to establish that the
theory, process, and method of latent fingerprint
identification could be applied reliably to
simultaneous impressions not capable of being
individually matched to any of the fingers that
supposedly made them.205

generally accepts fingerprint identification. But the
scientific/nonscientific distinction is irrelevant after Kumho
Tire, and accordingly we reject the argument. We also note
that the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit . . . relied
heavily on general acceptance to support the admission of
fingerprint identification evidence. See United States v.
Crisp, 324 F.3d 261 (4th Cir. 2003). We likewise conclude
that this factor weighs in favor of admitting the evidence.
Id. (citation omitted).
202. Commonwealth v. Patterson, 840 N.E.2d 12, 15 (Mass. 2005).
203. Id. at 14.
204. Id. at 14-15.
205. Id. at 15.
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It should be noted, however, that the court emphasized that the
traditional method of fingerprint identification satisfied
Daubert.206
Llera Plaza I and II, Crisp, Mitchell I, and Patterson
demonstrate that American courts, to differing degrees and on
the basis of different approaches to Daubert, had some concerns
about the practice of fingerprint identification prior to the
release of the NAS Report in February 2009. The impact of the
NAS Report is considered in the following cases.
In December 2009, Brian Rose challenged the admissibility
of fingerprint evidence that allegedly linked him to a fatal
carjacking. In United States v. Rose,207 a federal court in
Maryland ruled that precedent,208 the general acceptance of the
ACE-V method in the fingerprint community,209 and the lack of
evidence to contradict the conclusion that misidentifications
were extremely rare all favored the admission of the
fingerprint evidence.210 The court acknowledged the NAS
Report’s use of a study that found there was no “available
scientific evidence of the validity of the ACE-V method.”211
However, the court emphasized that “the report itself did not
conclude that fingerprint evidence was unreliable such as to
render it inadmissible,”212 and its authors did not intend to
answer the “question whether forensic evidence in a particular
case is admissible under applicable law.”213
In United States v. Baines,214 the United States Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals made no mention of the NAS Report
when upholding a decision to admit evidence that a “thumb
print found on some of the contraband . . . was a match to
Baines’ [sic] print.”215 In so holding, the court took yet another
approach to Daubert. Somewhat like the court in Mitchell I, the
206. Id. at 32-33.
207. United States v. Rose, 672 F. Supp. 2d 723 (D. Md. 2009).
208. Id. at 725.
209. Id. at 726
210. Id.
211. Id. at 725 (internal quotation marks omitted).
212. Id.
213. Id. (quoting Hon. Harry T. Edwards, Statement before U.S. Senate
Judiciary Committee (Mar. 18, 2009)).
214. United States v. Baines, 573 F.3d 979 (10th Cir. 2009).
215. Id. at 980.
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Tenth Circuit found that:
[W]hile . . . this record does not show that
[fingerprint identification] has been subject to
testing that would meet all of the standards of
science, it would be unrealistic in the extreme for
us to ignore the countervailing evidence.
Fingerprint identification has been used
extensively by law enforcement agencies all over
the world for almost a century.216
However like Judge Michael in Crisp, the court acknowledged
that proficiency tests had been heavily criticized. On that basis,
the court opined that the testing factor did not weigh
“powerfully” in favor of admission.217 Unlike the Mitchell I
court, the Baines court found that peer review did not favor
admissibility because “the verification stage of the ACE-V
process is not the independent peer review of true science.”218
Benedict agrees with this assessment, stating that the process
of more than one fingerprint examiner performing the
identification process
is not the meaning of peer review under Daubert,
or as used by scientists generally. Rather, the
term refers to a formal submission of research to
a scientific journal, whose editorial board of
fellow scientists carefully examines it. It is not
merely a second opinion rendered by another
examiner . . . [that] does little to put a scientific
gloss on the first opinion.219
Like most other courts, the Tenth Circuit accepted that the
discipline had a very low error rate, which “strongly” favored
admission.220 The court put significant emphasis on the state’s
216. Id. at 990.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Benedict, supra note 63, at 530 (alteration in original) (footnotes
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
220. Baines, 573 F.3d at 991.
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testimony that the discipline had an error rate of one in every
eleven million cases, which was unchallenged by the defense.221
In tackling the criticisms aimed at proficiency tests, the court
acknowledged that “[v]ery few mistakes are reported in testing
that trainees must complete before progressing to actual
casework.”222 The court acknowledged the possibility of
erroneous identifications and that “[d]efense attorneys rarely
have the resources to hire independent experts for trial,” but
found “even allowing for the likelihood that the actual error
rate . . . may be higher than reflected[,] . . . the known error
rate remains impressively low.”223 Applying Mitchell I,
however, the court found the “controlling standards” factor did
not favor admission, as ACE-V “is a procedural standard but
not a substantive one. Critical steps in the process depend on
the subjective judgment of the analyst.”224 The court relied on
precedent to determine that fingerprint identification had an
“overwhelming” acceptance in the courts (and other
professional bodies), which favored admission.225
The Supreme Court of Massachusetts considered the NAS
Report in more detail in Commonwealth v. Gambora in 2010.226
After being convicted of murder and other related offenses,
Gambora used the NAS Report to challenge evidence that
matched his fingerprints to latent prints found on a door. The
court acknowledged, in considerable depth, the concerns raised
about the reliability of fingerprint identification in the NAS
221. Id. at 990-91.
222. Id. at 990.
223. Id. at 991.
224. Id. Notably, the Tenth Circuit made this finding arguendo because
the factor was not critical to its decision.
225. Id. at 991-92. In closing, the court echoed the thoughts of
Judge Pollak, who said regarding the desirability of
research to provide the scrutiny and independent
verification of the scientific method to aid in assessing the
reliability of fingerprint evidence, that such efforts would be
“all to the good. But to postpone present in-court utilization
of this ‘bedrock forensic identifier’ pending such research
would be to make the best the enemy of the good.”
Id. at 992 (quoting United States v. Llera Plaza, 188 F. Supp. 2d 549, 572
(E.D. Pa. 2002)).
226. Commonwealth v. Gambora, 933 N.E.2d 50 (Mass. 2010).
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Report. However, the court emphasized that the NAS Report
had not argued for, and did not result in, the wholesale
exclusion of fingerprint evidence.227 The court admitted the
evidence.228
Despite being a typical ruling, Gambora made two
important impacts. First, it highlighted that some of the NAS
Report’s conclusions are confusing. The court stated
[a]s our discussion of the NAS Report reflects,
there is tension in the report between its
assessments that, on the one hand it seems
plausible that a careful comparison of two
impressions can accurately discern whether or
not they had a common source, but that on the
other, merely following the steps of ACE–V does
not imply that one is proceeding in a scientific
manner or producing reliable results.229
The court felt unable to resolve this tension in Gambora.230
Second, Gambora represents the first restriction on fingerprint
identification evidence as a direct consequence of the NAS
Report. The court said
based on the NAS Report, we can say this much
at the present time: Testimony to the effect that
a latent print matches, or is “individualized” to, a
known print, if it is to be offered, should be
presented as an opinion, not a fact, and opinions
expressing absolute certainty about, or the
infallibility of, an “individualization” of a print
should be avoided.231
227. Id. at 58.
228. It is important to note that the Gambora decision was somewhat
molded by the fact the Defendant testified at trial that he put his hand on the
door in question. Furthermore, substantial other evidence connected the
defendant to the scene of the robbery and homicide. Id. at 61.
229. Id. at 61 n.21 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
230. Id. at 61 n.22
231. Id. However it should be noted that the court also concluded that
“nothing in this [Gambora] opinion should be read to suggest that the
existence of the NAS Report alone will require [Daubert] hearings as to the
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Notably, shortly before the Gambora decision, the
International Association for Identification (“IAI”)—the
primary professional association for those engaged in forensic
identification practices—also advocated for examiners to
refrain from declaring individualizations. Resolution 2010-18
resolves, inter alia, that “[e]xaminers shall only use
mathematically based models that have been accepted as valid
by the IAI in partnership with the relevant scientific
community and in which they have been trained to
competency.”232
Weeks after Gambora, Ajmal Aman moved to exclude
fingerprint evidence that allegedly linked him to an arson fire.
In United States v. Aman,233 a United States District Court in
Virginia opined that “[t]he absence of a known error rate, the
lack of population studies, and the involvement of examiner
judgment all raise important questions about the rigorousness
of friction ridge analysis.”234 The court acknowledged the NAS
Report’s concern that the discipline had not been subjected to
population studies to demonstrate its precision,235 and noted
general reliability of fingerprint identifications.” Id.
232. Int’l Ass’n of Identification [IAI], Resolution 2010-18, ¶ 7 (July 16,
2010).
It is the responsibility of forensic experts to offer a clear and
unambiguous presentation of their conclusions. Friction
ridge skin impressions can display varying levels of
commonality (pattern type, ridge flow) in appearance with
other impressions which do not derive from the same source.
Friction ridge skin impressions can share class
characteristics (pattern type, ridge flow) and any
associations based on these criteria require, ethically and
professionally, that the examiner clearly state any
limitations of their conclusions. The use of mathematically
based models to assess the associative value of the evidence
may provide a scientifically sound basis for supporting the
examiner’s
opinion.
Examiners
shall
only
use
mathematically based models that have been accepted as
valid by the IAI in partnership with the relevant scientific
community and in which they have been trained to
competency.
Id. at ¶¶ 4-7.
233. 748 F. Supp. 2d 531 (E.D. Va. 2010).
234. Id. at 541.
235. Id. at 540.
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that “while fingerprint experts sometimes use terms like
‘absolute’ and ‘positive’ to describe the confidence of their
matches, the NRC has recognized that a zero-percent error rate
is ‘not scientifically plausible.’”236 The court agreed that further
testing and study would enhance the precision and
reviewability of fingerprint examiners’ work,237 but, relying on
Crisp, ruled that Aman’s challenge was appropriate for crossexamination and not grounds for exclusion.238
In June 2011, Donny Love challenged the admission of
fingerprint evidence that allegedly connected him to the 2008
bombing of a federal courthouse in San Diego. In United States
v. Love,239 a United States District Court in California
recognized that the NAS Report criticized some aspects of
fingerprint analysis, but denied Love’s challenge. In so holding,
the court used yet a different overall approach to Daubert. The
court based its conclusion, in part, on precedent240 and on
evidence that “the forensic science community generally . . .
ha[s] beg[a]n to take appropriate steps to respond to [the]
criticism [contained in the NAS Report] . . . .”241 With regards
to error rate, the court picked up on a “May 2011 study of the
performance of 169 fingerprint examiners [which] revealed a
total of six false positives among 4,083 comparisons of non236. Id.
237. Id. at 541.
238. Id. at 540 n.9. The Aman court relied on the Crisp court’s view that:
[T]he district court heard testimony to the effect that the
expert community has consistently vouched for the
reliability of the fingerprinting identification technique over
the course of decades . . . . The district court also heard
evidence from which it was entitled to find the existence of
professional standards controlling the technique's operation.
Those standards provide adequate assurance of consistency
among fingerprint analyses. Finally, the court heard
testimony that fingerprint identification has an exceedingly
low rate of error, and the court was likewise within its
discretion in crediting that evidence.
United States v. Crisp, 324 F.3d 261, 269 (4th Cir. 2003).
239. United States v. Love, No. 10-cr-2418 (MMM), 2011 WL 2173644
(S.D. Cal. June 1, 2011).
240. Id. at *8.
241. Id.
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matching fingerprints for an overall false positive rate of
0.1%.”242
In response to the Defendant’s comments about Brandon
Mayfield’s case, the court said “one confirmed misidentification
is in no way inconsistent with an exceedingly low rate of error.
. . . Of course, any misidentification is troublesome. Without
more foundation, however, this statement does not translate
into a quantifiable error rate.”243 With regards to controlling
standards, the court acknowledged that the standards used in
fingerprint analysis were insubstantial compared to those
employed by scientific disciplines, citing Mitchell I.244 Unlike
Mitchell I (and Baines), however, the Love court found that the
procedural nature of the ACE-V method (in this case, in the
context of the FBI) and the stringent qualification process for
FBI Agents favored admission.245
It was in its consideration of general acceptance that the
Love court departed from precedent, finding it only weakly
supported admission.246 The court agreed that the NAS Report
demonstrated “some hesitancy in accepting latent fingerprint
analysis on the part of the broader scientific community.”247
However, the court did not reject “general acceptance” entirely
because “forensic science and law enforcement communities
strongly support the use of friction ridge analysis.”248 The court
concluded that “[f]riction ridge analysis is not foolproof, but it
is also far removed from the types of ‘junk science’ that must be
excluded under . . . Daubert[] and Kumho.”249 This is contrary
to one scholar’s view that the “gold standard” of fingerprinting
identification may be more akin to “fool’s gold.”250

242. Id. at *5 (internal quotation marks omitted).
243. Id.
244. Id. at *6.
245. Id. at *6-7.
246. Id. at *7.
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. Id. at *8.
250. Brooke G. Malcom, Comment, Convictions Predicated on DNA
Evidence Alone: How Reliable Evidence Became Infallible, 38 CUMB. L. REV.
313, 328 (2008).
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In August 2011, after being convicted of first-degree
murder, Edward Mitchell challenged the fingerprint evidence
against him. In Illinois v. Mitchell (Mitchell II),251 the majority
of the Illinois Appellate Court found that (1) the trial court did
not err by admitting expert testimony that failed to account for
five of the thirteen points allegedly found between Mitchell’s
print and the suspect print; and (2) the trial court did not err
by failing to conduct an admissibility hearing concerning the
methodology used by the relevant fingerprint expert.252 The
court made no substantive mention of the NAS report’s
findings,253 but in his dissent, Judge Gordon appeared to follow
the NAS Report’s findings in that he berated the experts
involved for not making notes of their processes and
conclusions.254
Shortly after Mitchell II, United States v. GutierrezCastro255 came before the United States District Court in New
Mexico. In that case, Gutierrez-Castro was accused of “re-entry
of an illegal alien” and the state wanted to introduce the
testimony of James McNutt.256 McNutt would testify that
suspect prints belonged to Gutierrez-Castro.257 In GutierrezCastro, the Court used the NAS Report in a very narrow sense.
Gutierrez-Castro argued that, while McNutt was a certified
fingerprint examiner and that he had completed several classes
on fingerprint analysis, the NAS Report “indicate[d] that
certification may not be a valid indication of knowledge or
ability.”258 Gutierrez-Castro argued there was no standardized
or approved method of certification; hence McNutt was not
qualified to offer expert testimony about fingerprint analysis.

251. People v. Mitchell (Mitchell II), 353 Ill. Dec. 369 (App. Ct. Aug. 5,
2011).
252. Id. at 373-76.
253. The NAS Report’s description of the ACE-V method was mentioned.
Id. at 386 (Gordon, J., dissenting).
254. Id. at 382 (Gordon, J., dissenting).
255. United States v. Gutierrez-Castro, 805 F. Supp. 2d 1218 (D.N.M.
2011).
256. Id. at 1221-22.
257. Id. at 1220.
258. Id. at 1228.
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Without engaging the NAS Report,259 the court rejected
Gutierrez-Castro’s argument, seemingly siding with the state’s
argument that “McNutt ha[d] undergone demanding training
culminating in” regular proficiency tests.260 Like other courts,
the Gutierrez-Castro court was not deterred by concerns that
most proficiency tests do not reflect real-life conditions.
Interestingly, the court gave permission for McNutt to testify,
but would not allow: (1) the state to offer him as an expert
witness in the jury’s presence; (2) the trial court to certify
McNutt as an expert witness in the jury’s presence; and (3)
allow the jury instructions to refer to McNutt as an expert.261
The Gutierrez-Castro decision arguably responds to the
idea that jurors are easily seduced by people described as
experts and as a consequence pay little attention to the veracity
of the discipline they are tasked with judging.262 In the context
of fingerprint identification, for example, studies have found
that a vast majority of jurors agree that fingerprint
identification is a “science”263 and that fingerprints are the
most reliable means of identification.264 In United States v.
Watkins, Eric Watkins challenged a decision to admit
fingerprint evidence that linked him to, inter alia, an armed
robbery.265 Specifically, Watkins challenged the state’s expert
who claimed that when ACE–V “is used properly by a
competent examiner, the error rate for identification is zero.”266
259. Although the court noted that McNutt had acknowledged that the
NAS Report calls into question ACE–V methodology. Id. at 1233.
260. Id. at 1228.
261. Id. The court held that the issues that the parties “bring out during
McNutt's direct examination and cross-examination will go to the weight and
credibility of McNutt's testimony.” Id.
262. See
Simon
Cole,
Grandfathering
Evidence:
Fingerprint
Admissibility Rulings From Jennings to Llera Plaza and Back Again, 41 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 1189 (2004) (general proposition that jurors are easily seduced).
263. Charles Illsley, Juries, Fingerprints, and the Expert Fingerprint
Witness, Address at the International Symposium on Latent Prints (July 711, 1987) (finding ninety-three percent of jurors agree that fingerprint
identification is a science; only two percent disagree), available at
http://www.nlada.org/forensics/for_lib/Documents/1056493657.7/Illsey.pdf.
264. Id. (finding that eighty-four percent of potential jurors agree that
“fingerprints are the most reliable means of identifying a person,” and only
eight percent disagree).
265. 450 F. App’x 511, 512 (6th Cir. 2011).
266. Id. at 515 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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In support, Watkins cited the NAS Report’s conclusion that
such claims were impractical.267 The Sixth Circuit rejected
Watkins’s argument on two grounds. First, the court said that
it would not consider evidence, namely the NAS Report, which
was not before the lower court.268 Second, the court reasoned
that even “assuming arguendo that the ACE–V method is not
error-free, the fact that the fingerprint examiner testified that
it was [one hundred percent] accurate does not by itself mean
that the district court erred in determining that the ACE–V
method was scientifically valid.”269 The court declined to hold
that the “allegedly mistaken error-rate testimony negates the
scientific validity of the ACE–V method given all the other
factors that the district court was required to consider.”270
The aforementioned cases demonstrate that between 2000
and 2011 American courts favored the admission of fingerprint
identification evidence under Daubert. In doing so, these courts
relied heavily on precedent to support their decisions and on
the adversary system to weed out the fragilities of fingerprint
analysis. These cases also demonstrate that American courts
are taking inconsistent approaches to Daubert. These cases
demonstrate that, in descending order of potency, the courts
have been most critical of peer review, controlling standards,
and testability. The courts are noting that these three areas
are lacking in scientific underpinnings. Additionally, the cases
illustrate that American courts are persuaded that fingerprint
identification has a low error-rate and is generally accepted in
the relevant fields.
The Aman, Rose, Baines, Gambora, Castro, Mitchell II,
Love, and Watkins cases all demonstrate that courts are
generally acknowledging the NAS Report since its publication.
However, the courts are responding to the NAS Report’s
criticisms of fingerprint analysis to different degrees. Some
courts have paid lip service to the report, whereas others have
engaged in a more extensive evaluation of its findings. Overall,
post-NAS Report courts have: (1) made decisions to restrict

267.
268.
269.
270.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 516.
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testimony directly as a result of the NAS Report;271 (2) been
more critical of the ability of fingerprint evidence to satisfy
Daubert than pre-NAS Report courts, while not going so far as
to deny admission of fingerprint evidence because of the NAS
Report’s findings; (3) placed emphasis on the NAS Report’s
position that it did not intend to answer the question of
whether forensic evidence in a particular case is admissible
under applicable law;272 (4) responded favorably to attempts by
the forensic community to fill the gaps identified by the NAS
Report;273 (5) highlighted areas of contradiction in the NAS
Report’s conclusions;274 and (6) relied on precedent and the
adversary process to resolve and neutralize their concerns
about the reliability of fingerprint evidence in the light of the
NAS Report.275
B. Firearms Identification
In the early stages of the new millennium, American
courts continued to fully embrace firearms identification
evidence that matched suspect ammunition to a weapon linked
with a defendant. In United States v. Santiago, Judge Marrero
was quick to point out that the Llera Plaza I decision had no
bearing on “ballistics” cases, and there was no precedent
suggesting “the entire field of ballistics identification is
unreliable.”276 In United States v. Hicks, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that based on the
widespread acceptance of firearms comparison testing, the
existence of standards governing such testing, the discipline’s
negligible error rate (the court received testimony that the
error rate was “zero or near to zero”), and the methodology
271. E.g., Commonwealth v. Gambora, 933 N.E.2d 50, 58-60 (Mass.
2010).
272. E.g., United States v. Rose, 672 F. Supp. 2d 723, 726 (D. Md. 2009);
id. at 58.
273. E.g., United States v. Love, No. 10-cr-2418 (MMM), 2011 WL
2173644, at *8 (S.D. Cal. June 1, 2011).
274. E.g., Gambora, 933 N.E.2d at 59-60.
275. E.g., United States v. Crisp, 324 F.3d 261, 267 (4th Cir. 2003);
United States v. Aman, 748 F. Supp. 2d 531, 541-42 (E.D. Va. 2010).
276. United States v. Santiago, 199 F. Supp. 2d 101, 110-11 (S.D.N.Y.
2002).
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employed by the state’s ballistics expert, which allowed him to
conclude that suspect casings were fired from a rifle found in
Hicks’s residence, was reliable.277 Both Santiago and Hicks
afforded firearms identification scientific credit, while focusing
on precedent and the experience of the examiner to support
admission.
A conservative shift manifested in 2005, however. In
United States v. Green,278 the state sought to admit expert
testimony that Green’s pistol could be matched, “to the
exclusion of every other firearm in the world,” to suspect shell
casings in a racketeering prosecution.279 Judge Nancy Gertner
of the United States District Court for the District of
Massachusetts held that such a conclusion was extraordinary
given the data and methods employed by the examiner.280
Judge Gertner detailed a long list of serious deficiencies in
the field of firearms identification. She criticized the lack of
guidelines available to distinguish between class and sub-class
tool-mark characteristics,281 the heavily subjective nature of
declaring a match,282 the potential for confirmatory bias to
skew the examiners results (“the only weapon [the examiner]
was shown was the suspect one: the only inquiry was whether
the shell casings found earlier matched it”),283 and the
examiner’s failure to document his analysis and to follow
procedure.284 She also vociferously disagreed with the
277.
278.
279.
280.
281.
282.
283.

United States v. Hicks, 389 F.3d 514, 526 (5th Cir. 2004).
United States v. Green, 405 F. Supp. 2d 104 (D. Mass. 2005).
Id. at 107 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 107.
Id. at 110-13.
Id. at 114.
Id. at 107.
It was, in effect, an evidentiary “show-up,” not what
scientists would regard as a “blind” test. He was not asked
to try to match the casings to the other test-fired Hi Point
weapons in police custody, or any other gun for that matter,
an examination more equivalent to an evidentiary “line-up.”
His work was reviewed by another officer, who did the same
thing—checked his conclusions under the same conditions—
another evidentiary “show-up.”

Id. at 108.
284. Id. at 114-15.
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applicable precedents, as “every single court post-Daubert has
admitted this testimony.”285 Despite all this, Judge Gertner
reluctantly admitted the expert testimony. However, her
decision was qualified:
[N]otwithstanding my serious reservations, I feel
compelled to allow [the state’s expert] to testify
about his observations of the shell casings . . . ,
and about his comparison of those casings to the
suspect . . . weapon. . . . However, . . . O’Shea
may only describe and explain the ways in which
the earlier casings are similar to the shell
casings test-fired from the . . . pistol. . . . I will
not allow him to conclude that the shell casings
come from a specific . . . pistol . . . to the
exclusion of every other firearm in the world.
That conclusion—that there is a definitive
match—stretches well beyond O’Shea’s data and
285. Id. at 108.
I reluctantly come to the above conclusion because of my
confidence that any other decision will be rejected by
appellate courts, in light of precedents across the country,
regardless of the findings I have made. While I recognize
that the Daubert-Kumho standard does not require the
illusory perfection of a television show (CSI, this wasn't),
when liberty hangs in the balance-and, in the case of the
defendants facing the death penalty, life itself-the standards
should be higher than were met in this case, and than have
been imposed across the country. The more courts admit
this type of toolmark evidence without requiring
documentation, proficiency testing, or evidence of reliability,
the more sloppy practices will endure; we should require
more.
Id. at 109 (footnote omitted).
This reliance on long-standing use of ballistics evidence in
the courts is troubling. It runs the risk of “grandfathering in
irrationality,” without reexamining it in the light of Kumho
and Daubert. It arguably ignores the mandate of Daubert,
especially where the courts are relying on pre-Daubert
acceptance of a given scientific technique.
Id. at 123.
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methodology.286
The same court considered a similar challenge weeks later
in United States v. Monteiro.287 Monteiro sought to exclude
expert testimony that suspect cartridge cases matched firearms
linked to him.288 The court rejected Monteiro’s challenge,
finding that the underlying scientific principle of
individualization in firearm identification was valid.289 The
court found that “the existence of the requirements of peer
review and documentation ensure sufficient testability and
reproducibility to ensure that the results of the technique are
reliable.”290 Despite the subjective judgment involved in
making an identification, the defendant could conduct her own
testing, proffer her own experts and use cross examination to
test the evidence.291 In considering peer review, the court found
that although “there appears to be a disagreement in the peer
reviewed literature as to the reliability of the AFTE method of
identification, consensus is not necessary.”292 With regards to
error rate, the court concluded that the known error rate is “not
unacceptably high.”293 The court was troubled that there were
no universal standards for declaring a match, but found that it
was not fatal because documentation and peer review helped
maintain standards.294 Moreover, the examiner’s specialized
training and experience favored admission.295
Despite this, Monteiro added to the more conservative
approach taken in Green. Although the court admitted the
testimony, again its decision was qualified:

286.
287.
288.
289.
290.
291.
292.
293.
294.
295.

Id. at 108-09 (footnote omitted).
407 F. Supp. 2d 351 (D. Mass. 2006).
Id. at 354.
Id. at 355.
Id. at 369.
Id.
Id. at 367.
Id. at 368.
Id. at 371.
Id.
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One important caveat: during the
testimony at the hearing, the examiners testified
to the effect that they could be [one hundred]
percent sure of a match. Because an examiner’s
bottom line opinion as to an identification is
largely a subjective one, there is no reliable
statistical or scientific methodology which will
currently permit the expert to testify that it is a
“match” to an absolute certainty, or to an
arbitrary degree of statistical certainty. Allowing
the firearms examiner to testify to a reasonable
degree of ballistic certainty permits the expert to
offer her findings, but does not allow her to say
more than is currently justified by the prevailing
methodology.296
As Schwartz explains, the Green and Monteiro decisions
“took major steps towards recognizing the systemic scientific
problems
and
excluding
firearms
and
tool
mark
297
identifications.”
Subsequent cases, however, demonstrate
inconsistent results.
In the 2007 case of United States v. Natson,298 the court
ignored Green and Monteiro. In Natson, a firearm examiner
opined that the tool-marks present on a suspect cartridge were
an exact match to those produced by Natson’s gun.299 The court
found that the examiner’s opinion was “based upon a
scientifically valid methodology.”300 That methodology was
tested, subjected to peer review, had an ascertainable error
rate, and was generally accepted in the scientific community.301
On the other hand, United States v. Diaz302 followed
Monteiro. In that case, the court found that claims of
individualization, in the firearms identification field, were not
296. Id. at 372 (emphasis added).
297. Schwartz, supra note 85, at 10.
298. 469 F. Supp. 2d 1253 (M.D. Ga. 2007).
299. Id. at 1254.
300. Id. at 1261.
301. Id.
302. United States v. Diaz, No. 05-cr-00167 (WHA), 2007 WL 485967
(N.D. Cal. Feb. 12, 2007).
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supported.303 Thus, the court only allowed the examiners to
“testify that a match has been made to a reasonable degree of
certainty in the ballistics field.”304 An examiner’s “keen
practiced eye for discerning the extent of matching patterns”
outweighed any concerns about the subjective nature of making
an identification.305
In 2008, in United States v. Glynn,306 the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York took a
different approach to Green, Monteiro, Natson and Diaz. At
trial, the state sought to introduce expert testimony that “to a
reasonable degree of ballistic certainty” suspect ammunition
came from firearms linked to Glynn.307 Glynn moved to exclude
the testimony, arguing the discipline was not based on
sufficiently reliable methods.308 The court concluded that
firearms identification “not only lacks the rigor of science but
suffers from greater uncertainty than many other kinds of
forensic evidence.”309 However, while the “subjectivity and
vagueness [involved in firearms identification] might suggest
that [it] involves little more than a hunch, such a
characterization would be unfair.”310 This is because the court
found that the methodology of firearms identification had
garnered “sufficient empirical support as to warrant its
admissibility.”311 The court admitted the testimony, but was
conscious that:
The problem is how to admit it into evidence
without giving the jury the impression—always a
risk where forensic evidence is concerned—that
it has greater reliability than its imperfect
methodology
permits.
The
problem
is
compounded by the tendency of ballistics experts

303.
304.
305.
306.
307.
308.
309.
310.
311.

Id. at *1.
Id. at *1 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id.
United States v. Glynn, 578 F. Supp. 2d 567 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
Id. at 568.
Id.
Id. at 574.
Id. at 572.
Id. at 574.
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. . . to make assertions that their matches are
certain beyond all doubt, that the error rate of
their methodology is “zero,” and other such
pretensions.
Although
effective
crossexamination may mitigate some of these dangers
. . . when it comes to expert testimony, crossexamination is inherently handicapped by the
jury’s own lack of background knowledge, so that
the Court must play a greater role, not only in
excluding unreliable testimony, but also in
alerting the jury to the limitations of what is
presented.312
The court concluded that allowing the examiner to testify
that he had matched ammunition to a particular gun “to a
reasonable degree of ballistic certainty” would “seriously
mislead the jury as to the nature of the expertise involved.”313
To resolve this problem, the court: (1) limited the examiner to
testifying that a firearms match was more likely than not; (2)
prevented the expert from testifying that he reached his
conclusions to any degree of certainty; and (3) prevented the
expert from testifying that ballistics was a science.314
In October 2009, eight months after the publication of the
NAS Report, United States v. Taylor315 was decided by the
United States District Court for the District of New Mexico.
Taylor had moved to exclude evidence that his rifle could be
matched to suspect ammunition in a racketeering
prosecution.316 The court factored an earlier report from the
NAS—Ballistic Imaging, Committee to Assess the Feasibility,
Accuracy, and Technical Capability of a National Ballistics
Database (“Ballistic Imaging Report”)317—in to its Daubert
312. Id.
313. Id.
314. Id. at *13-14.
315. United States v. Taylor, 663 F. Supp. 2d 1170 (D.N.M. 2009).
316. Id. at 1172.
317. Id. at 1175-76. The Ballistics Imaging Report was focused on the
feasibility of a national ballistics database. The Committee emphasized that
its “report was not meant to be an overall assessment of firearms
identification as a discipline.” Id. at 1176.
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analysis. First, with regards to testing, the court acknowledged
the Ballistic Imaging Report’s findings that (1) “[t]he validity of
the
fundamental
assumptions
of
uniqueness
and
reproducibility of firearms-related toolmarks has not yet been
fully demonstrated”318 and (2) “[a] significant amount of
research would be needed to scientifically determine the degree
to which firearms-related tool-marks are unique or even to
qualitatively characterize the probability of uniqueness.”319
However, on the basis that numerous studies indicated that
there is “some level of reproducibility,”320 and industry
standards typically require an examiner to document his
findings and have them double-checked by another examiner,
the court found there was “at least some significant level of
testability and reproducibility.”321 Second, in terms of peer
review, the court found the existence of the AFTE Journal and
two articles in the Journal of Forensic Science, both of which
are peer-reviewed, “clearly weighs in favor of admissibility.”322
Third, the court found that the discipline’s “error rate [was]
quite low” on the basis of data from CTS testing carried out
between 1978 and 1991.323
The Taylor court considered the 2009 NAS Report in the
context of controlling standards. The court found that
“[a]rguably the biggest obstacle facing any firearms examiner
is that there is no such thing as a ‘perfect match.’”324 The court
partially attributed this to the circular nature of the AFTE

However, the Committee also recognized that the question
of the feasibility of a national ballistics database was
inextricably intertwined with the question of whether a
particular set of tool marks can be shown to come from one
weapon to the exclusion of all others, and thus the
Committee felt compelled to point out the weaknesses in
that theory.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
318. Id. at 1175.
319. Id. at 1175-76.
320. Id. at 1176.
321. Id.
322. Id.
323. Id. at 1177. Data from CTS testing carried out between 1978 and
1991 suggest that the rate of false identification is less than one percent. Id.
324. Id.
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Theory of Identification, which “does not provide any uniform
numerical standard examiners can use to determine whether
or not there is a match . . . .”325 Thus, much is left to the
subjective eye of the examiner.326 The court acknowledged that
the NAS Report had recognized this problem, but did not
indicate whether such criticism did or did not favor admission
of the expert testimony.327 However, it did find that the AFTE
Theory was “generally accepted” because it was widely
accepted (although not universally followed) by trained
firearms examiners.328 Following Monteiro and Diaz, the Taylor
court admitted the firearms evidence, but restricted the
examiner to testifying that the ammunition came from Taylor’s
rifle to within a “reasonable degree of certainty in the firearms
examination field.”329 In so holding, the court noted that
precedent favored admission, but accepted that a more
conservative approach towards firearms identification had
slowly begun to build.
In 2011, the decision in Commonwealth v. Pytou Heang330
caused further inconsistency. In that case, Pytou Heang alleged
that the trial court had erred in allowing the state’s expert to
testify that his AB-10 handgun had fired ammunition involved
in the crime.331 The court acknowledged that the accuracy,
reliability and scientific basis of firearms identification had
been critiqued in the Ballistics Imaging Report and the NAS
Report.332 Thus, the court found two main problems with
firearms identification: (1) “there is little scientific proof
supporting the theory that each firearm imparts ‘unique’
individual characteristic toolmarks on to [ammunition];” and
325. Id.
326. Id.
327. Id. at 1177-78. In addition to the issues surrounding the AFTE
Protocol, the court noted an additional problem with firearms identification –
confirmatory bias. The court acknowledged that it is typical practice for an
examiner to be handed only one suspect weapon and the recovered
ammunition, which creates “a potentially significant ‘observer effect’ whereby
the examiner knows that he is testing a suspect weapon and may be
predisposed to find a match.” Id. at 1179.
328. Id. at 1178.
329. Id. at 1180.
330. Commonwealth v. Pytou Heang, 942 N.E.2d 927 (Mass. 2011).
331. Id. at 937-38.
332. Id. at 938.
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(2) the matching of individual characteristics is highly
subjective.333 In light of these concerns, and to inject more
reliability into the firearms identification process, the court
designed a three-part approach that was to be taken by
firearms examiners when testifying:
First, before trial, the examiner must adequately
document the findings or observations that
support the examiner’s ultimate opinion, and
this documentary evidence, whether in the form
of
measurements,
notes,
sketches,
or
photographs, shall be provided in discovery, so
that defense counsel will have an adequate and
informed basis to cross-examine the forensic
ballistics expert at trial. . . .
Second, before an opinion is offered at
trial, a forensic ballistics expert should explain to
the jury the theories and methodologies
underlying the field of forensic ballistics. . . .
Third, in the absence of special
circumstances casting doubt on the reliability of
an opinion . . . a forensic ballistics expert may
present an expert’s opinion of the toolmarks
found on projectiles and cartridge casings. Where
a qualified expert has identified sufficient
individual characteristic toolmarks reasonably to
offer an opinion that a particular firearm fired a
projectile or cartridge casing recovered as
evidence, the expert may offer that opinion to a
reasonable degree of ballistic certainty.334
However, the court neither retroactively applied nor
prospectively required this approach in Pytou Heang’s case.
Instead, the court denied the appeal and sanctioned the state’s
claim of individualization between the suspect ammunition and
the defendant’s AB-10 hand-gun.335 The court found that
333. Id. at 941.
334. Id. at 944-45 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
335. Id. at 944.
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although the state’s expert had testified that the suspect
ammunition was “fired by that AB–10,” and that in his opinion
it was a “practical impossibility” that the ammunition came
from any other AB–10 firearm, there was no prejudicial
error.336 This was because the jury had been adequately
informed of the limitations surrounding firearms identification
throughout the entire proceedings.337
A number of American courts have changed their approach
to the admissibility of firearms identification evidence between
2004 and 2011. All of the aforementioned cases (except
Santiago, Hicks, and Natson) have moved firearms examiners
away from making claims of individualization by restricting
them to specific terminology and phrases, which allegedly
reflect less absolute conclusions. Overall, courts have taken
this approach because of concerns about the subjectivity of
firearms identification and its lack of empirical underpinnings
for claims of individualization. The impact this approach has
on jurors is important to understand because numerous studies
have shown that “jurors place special trust in expert[s]” and
scientific evidence.338 Furthermore, studies have shown jurors
to rate firearms examiners as among the most honest,
competent and influential experts.339
Some scholars have labelled Green, Monteiro, and Glynn as
“victories” for the defense and for the veracity of science.340
However, does restricting firearms examiners to phrases such
as “to a reasonable degree of certainty” and “more likely than
not” deter jurors from thinking there is a “match” between
suspect ammunition and a known weapon? A recent study by
Saks and McQuiston-Surrett suggests the answer is no.341 In
that study, both judges and jurors were found to be comfortable
336. Id.
337. Id.
338. Brandon Garrett & Peter Neufeld, Invalid Forensic Science
Testimony and Wrongful Convictions, 95 VA. L. REV. 1, 32 (2009).
339. Michael Saks & Roselle Wissler, Legal and Psychological Bases of
Expert Testimony, Surveys of the Law and of Jurors, 2 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 435,
445 (1984).
340. Schwartz, supra note 85, at 10.
341. Dawn McQuiston-Surrett & Michael Saks, Communicating Opinion
Evidence in the Forensic Identification Sciences: Accuracy and Impact, 59
HASTINGS L.J. 1159, 1188-89 (2008).
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converting subjective probability evidence into findings of
liability.342 Moreover, does cross-examination and testimony
about the shortcomings of firearms identification neutralize
any exaggerated trust jurors place in experts? Again, the Saks
and McQuiston-Surret study suggests the answer is no:
One might have expected an explication of
the examination process, emphasizing the
guesswork involved, would have a sobering effect
on fact finders, but it appears instead to lead fact
finders to be more impressed by the examination.
Similarly, since most jurors begin with an
exaggerated view of the nature and capabilities
of forensic identification, one might expect that
information explicitly informing fact finders
about the limitations of the expertise would
temper the jurors’ inferences. Such information
had little effect on jurors’ judgments.343
Thus, there is reason to believe that the changes adopted
by multiple courts between 2004 and 2011 in order to confront
the weaknesses behind claims of individualization in this field,
may not have the desired effect. This is perhaps unsurprising.
As Schwartz argues, “The problems with firearms and
toolmark examiners’ testimony are not linguistic, however, but
scientific: the requisite empirical and statistical foundations
have not been laid for either absolute or probabilistic
identification conclusions.”344
C. Bite Mark Identification
In the past, forensic odontologists have been skeptical
about their ability to engage in individualization.345 Despite
these reservations, the majority of American courts have
welcomed the admission of bite mark identification evidence
342.
343.
344.
345.

Id.
Id. at 1188.
Schwartz, supra note 85, at 14.
Saks, supra note 3, at 1119.
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since the 1980s. In fact, Saks argues that the courts have
“convinced” the forensic odontology community of their ability
to identify a perpetrator “to the exclusion of all others.”346 A
snapshot of cases decided between 1999 and 2011, demonstrate
that despite what is now significant, external criticism of the
discipline’s veracity, courts resist challenges to the
admissibility of bite mark identification evidence and, at times,
turn a blind eye to unsettling expert practices.
In Brooks v. State,347 Brooks had been convicted of capital
murder based, in part, on the testimony of Dr. Michael West,
who testified that two dentations present on the victim’s body
had been made by Brooks.348 Brooks claimed that his trial court
erred in admitting West’s testimony because he was not an
expert in forensic odontology.349 The Supreme Court of
Mississippi held that Brooks’s claim was procedurally barred,
but because bite mark evidence was “controversial,” the court
would address the issue’s merits.350 Despite concerns about
West and the fact other experts found inconsistencies between
the bite mark and Brooks’s teeth,351 the majority took the
chance to “state affirmatively that bite mark identification
evidence is admissible in Mississippi.”352 The court followed
precedent, stating that because Brooks had the opportunity “to
attack the qualifications of the expert, the methods and data
used to compare the bite marks to persons other than the
defendant, and the factual and logical bases of the expert’s
opinions.”353 In addition, Brooks had presented his own
experts.354

346. Id. at 1119-20.
347. Brooks v. State, 748 So. 2d 736 (Miss. 1999).
348. Id. at 739.
349. Id.
350. Id.
351. Id. at 740.
352. Id. at 739. Note that Justices Banks, Waller and Sullivan did not
agree with this approach in their concurring judgment. Id. at 747 (Banks, J.,
concurring). Justice McRae did not agree with this approach in his dissenting
judgment. Id. at 748 (McRae, J, dissenting).
353. Id. at 739 (quoting Howard v. State, 701 So. 2d 274, 288 (Miss.
1997)).
354. Id. at 740.
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Despite this result, the Brooks case demonstrates some
rumblings of disquiet about bite mark evidence in the courts
before the eve of the new millennium, as Justice McRae filed a
detailed dissent arguing:
The majority takes the opportunity to
conclude once and for all that forensic odontology
evidence is universally admissible . . . regardless
of the quality of that evidence and regardless of
the fact that the proponent of that evidence
claims that two indentations are teeth marks
unique to one person in the world. This is done
despite the fact that the discipline is without any
universal criteria or methodology. I dissent
because, not only do I have qualms about
proclaiming
that
bite-mark
evidence
is
admissible to specifically identify a person and
exclude everyone else, I also have reservations
about Michael West’s unmatched ability to
conclude that no one other than the defendant
could have produced the marks on the deceased
especially where, as here, other experts are
unwilling to testify that the marks could only be
bite marks and not something else.355
Judge McRae’s concerns were based on criticism about the
reliability of bite mark evidence,356 the sore divide between
expert opinions,357 and “West’s propensity for testifying with a
confidence seen in no other expert.”358 Justice McRae detailed
many concerns about West, including that he had materially
misrepresented evidence and data, used methods not founded
on scientific principles and claimed to have expertise in a vast
array of identification disciplines.359 Justice McRae concluded
that the majority’s “apparent willingness to allow West to
testify to anything and everything so long as the defense is
355.
356.
357.
358.
359.

Id. at 747-48 (McRae, J., dissenting).
Id. at 748.
Id.
Id. at 749.
Id. at 749-50.
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permitted to cross-examine him may be expedient for
prosecutors but it is harmful to the criminal justice system.”360
Given the benefit of hindsight, Justice McRae made a very
pertinent point—Brooks was exonerated by DNA evidence in
2008.361
Prior to Brooks’s exoneration, the Mississippi Supreme
Court relied on West’s testimony again in Stubbs v. State.362 In
that case, Stubbs was convicted of, inter alia, an aggravated
assault and subsequently challenged the admission of bite
mark evidence against her.363 At trial, West testified that the
victim had bite marks on her hip and that Stubbs could not be
excluded from being the donor.364 West concluded this after he
had pressed the dental mold of Stubbs’s teeth on to the victim’s
skin.365 Again, the court found that West was an expert in
forensic odontology, and because the adversary system allowed
Stubbs to attack West’s testimony, the trial court had not erred
in admitting West’s evidence.366 In so holding, the court relied
heavily on precedent.367 In June 2012, Stubbs’s aggravated
assault conviction was vacated.368
In 2010, over one year after the publication of the NAS
Report, the Court of Appeals of Kansas decided State v. LopezMartinez.369 In that case, a rape victim alleged that she had
360. Id. at 750 (footnote omitted).
361. Levon Brooks Exonerated in Mississippi, Forensic Reforms
Underway,
INNOCENCE
PROJECT
(Mar.
13,
2008),
http://www.innocenceproject.org/Content/Levon_Brooks_Exonerated_in_Missi
ssippi_Forensic_Reforms_Underway.php.
362. Stubbs v. State, 845 So. 2d 656 (Miss. 2003).
363. Id. at 657.
364. Id. at 662.
365. Id.
366. Id. at 669.
367. Id. In 2006, the same court followed suit in Howard v. State when
reaffirming Eddie Howard’s death sentence. 945 So. 2d 326 (Miss. 2007). In
that case, West had testified that to a “reasonable degree of certainty”
Howard's teeth matched a bite mark on the victim. Id. at 333. The court
found Howard’s claims were procedurally barred and without merit. Id. at
371.
368. Caleb Bedillion, Women Taste Freedom After Convictions Vacated,
THE
DAILY
LEADER,
June
30,
2012,
http://www.dailyleader.com/news/article_39b7af80-c20c-11e1-81a4001a4bcf887a.html.
369. State v. Lopez-Martinez, No. 100, 643, 2010 WL 2545626 (Kan.
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bitten her attacker on the shoulder.370 Lopez said the bite mark
on his shoulder was given to him by a young relative when the
two were roughhousing.371 At trial, an expert testified that the
victim’s teeth matched the bite mark on Lopez, and Lopez was
convicted.372 On appeal, Lopez argued that there was no
consensus with regards to the method or reliability of bite
mark evidence and therefore the expert’s testimony should
have been inadmissible.373 In support, Lopez provided
information about a 1999 study, which reported a sixty-three
percent error rate in bite mark analyses.374 However, the court
found this did not outweigh a clear 1980 precedent—State v.
Peoples.375 In Peoples, the court had held that bite mark
identification evidence was reliable and valuable to a jury.376
The Lopez court stated “we find no indication that our Supreme
Court is departing from its holding in Peoples. Without such an
indication, we are compelled to follow Peoples.”377
Despite this, Lopez-Martinez still represents a court feeling
uneasy about not revisiting precedent in light of the criticism of
bite mark identification. In his concurring judgment, Judge
App. June 11, 2010).
370. Id. at *1.
371. Id.
372. Id.
373. Id. at *2.
374. Id. (“Relying on articles in several periodicals, including a 2007
article in the New York Times regarding a 1999 study which reported a sixtythree percent rate of misidentifications in bite mark analyses, Lopez–
Martinez argues that the reliability of bite mark evidence is now in serious
doubt.”).
375. 605 P.2d 135 (Kan. 1980).
376. Id. at 132.
[B]ite-mark identification by an expert witness is
sufficiently reliable and can be a valuable aid to a jury in
understanding and interpreting evidence in a criminal case.
When the witness has the requisite skill and experience,
and demonstrates the accuracy and reliability of his models,
photographs, X-rays and supporting exhibits in bite mark
identification, the trial court in exercise of its power of
discretion may properly admit the opinion testimony of the
expert witness.
Id.
377. Lopez-Martinez, 2010 WL 2545626, at *2.
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Leben noted that the NAS Report, along with other sources,
“found that the uniqueness of human teeth had not been
scientifically established.”378 He concluded: “The Peoples
decision was issued more than 30 years ago, which is a long
time when considering the lifespan of a modern scientific
method’s validity. . . . But reliance solely on past cases can be a
problematic method for continued acceptance of scientific
tests.”379
However, in a further display of reluctance to find bite
mark evidence unreliable in the face of significant criticism, a
federal court in Texas admitted bite mark evidence in a highly
emotional case in 2011. In United States v. Bourgeois,380 the
court refused to “brush aside the heart-wrenching testimony
the jury heard” simply because the defendant proffered
technical, scientific testimony that “[t]he bite-marks found on
the victim cannot be traced to [him] with certainty any greater
than guess work.”381 The court’s judgment made no reference to
the NAS Report.
The Brooks, Stubbs, Howard, Lopez-Martinez and
Bourgeois cases generally support Beecher-Monas’s argument
that:
When defense counsel do challenge bitemark testimony, they are rarely successful.
Courts simply decline to engage in any serious
analysis of these challenges. By far the most
widely used gate-keeping avoidance technique
that judges employ is admitting bite-mark
evidence because other courts have done so.
Rather than engage in any analysis of the
scientific principles on which the testimony is
based, the data underlying the testimony, the
methodology, error rate, or general acceptance by
the scientific community, these courts skirt the
378. Id. at *4 (Leben, J., concurring).
379. Id.
380. United States v. Bourgeois, No. C-02-cr-216, 2011 WL 1930684
(S.D. Tex. May 19, 2011).
381. Id. at *95 (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
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entire issue . . . .382
The aforementioned cases also demonstrate that experts
use a variety of terms to explain their conclusions. These range
from declaring a “match” to probabilistic phrases such as
“consistent with” and “reasonable scientific certainty.”383 Again,
as discussed in relation to firearms identification, there is
reason to believe that these phrases do not have the desired
effect, that is, to deter jurors from thinking that there is a
certain strength of connection between the defendant and
suspect evidence.384
A further concern about the courts’ willingness to embrace
bite mark analysis, and place reliance on ABFO guidelines, is
that studies suggest that the terms used by bite mark
examiners are not being interpreted by jurors in the way the
ABFO intended. For example, under ABFO guidelines a
“match” simply means there is “some concordance” or “some
similarity” between two samples and the examiner does not
intend to make an expression of specificity.385 Although a
“match” is the weakest link an expert can make between a
suspect bite mark and a defendant, a 2008 study found that
people interpreted the word to indicate the strongest
association between crime scene evidence and its source.386
D. Arson Analysis
For years, fire investigators have been testifying that
physical signs such as pour patterns, “spider-web” glass, brown
stains on floors, and “V” shaped soot marks indicate that a fire
was incendiary. Investigators have picked up these alleged
signs of arson through experience. Since 1990, however,
scientific understanding about the behavior of both accidental
and incendiary fires has advanced. In 1990, an elaborate
experiment – the Lime Street Fire Experiment – was

382.
383.
384.
385.
386.

Beecher-Monas, supra note 103, at 1395 (footnote omitted).
McQuiston-Surrett & Saks, supra note 341, at 1162.
Id. at 1162-63.
Id. at 1162 tbl.I.
Id. at 1163.
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conducted.387 Without using an accelerant, investigators set fire
to a couch in a house and watched as “flashover”—the point at
which radiant heat causes a fire in a room to become a room on
fire—occurred.388 In short, investigators found that the classic
signs of arson, like pour patterns and “V” patterns, can also
appear on their own, i.e., without accelerant, after flashover.389
Thus, the evidential foundations of many arson convictions
have been undermined.390
In 2004, Alfred Albrecht Senior applied for post-conviction
relief on the basis that advances in fire science constituted
newly discovered evidence that proved his innocence.391
Albrecht had been convicted of capital murder after the state
produced evidence that he had used an accelerant to set a
house fire that killed his wife, mother and daughter.392 This
evidence included the presence of burn patterns in the house
and evidence of past threats from Albrecht to his wife.393
In Albrecht, the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania opined:
Petitioner has convincingly shown that
the fire science evidence presented by the
Commonwealth at his trial has since been
discredited. . . . He presented evidence that
modern
fire
science
considers
the
Commonwealth’s trial evidence to be an
unreliable basis upon which to conclude that a
liquid accelerant necessarily was involved and
that the fire could have been caused only by
arson. In short, Petitioner’s expert testified that
the fire science evidence in this case was as
387. JOHN J. LENTINI, THE LIME STREET FIRE: ANOTHER PERSPECTIVE 1
(1992),
available
at
http://www.firescientist.com/Documents/TheLimeStreetFireAnotherPerspective.pdf.
388. Id. at 2.
389. Id. at 3.
390. Grann, supra note 115.
391. Albrecht v. Horn, 314 F. Supp. 2d 451, 464 (E.D. Pa. 2004), vacated
on other grounds by, 485 F.3d 103 (3d Cir. 2007).
392. Id. at 455-56.
393. Id. at 455-57.
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consistent with an accidental fire—started in an
upholstered chair in the living room as claimed
by Petitioner—as with an accelerant fire
intentionally started in either the kitchen or the
living room.394
The court accepted that the fire could have been caused
“either intentionally or by accident,” but still rejected Albrecht’s
claim.395 The court reasoned that because circumstantial
evidence existed, namely a gas can covered in soot with
Albrecht’s fingerprints on it being found in Albrecht’s truck and
reports of domestic abuse, there was sufficient evidence to
support a rational inference that the fire was caused by
arson.396 As the advances in science only supported the idea
that the fire might have been accidental, and did not
completely “foreclose the possibility that the fire was started by
an arsonist using a liquid accelerant,” the court found that
Albrecht’s situation did not merit relief.397
A similar approach was taken by the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of New York in Ferranti
v United States.398 In that 2010 case, Ferranti had been
convicted of a number of arson related crimes, after being
charged with setting fire to his business – “Today’s Styles.”399
Fire investigators testified that burn patterns found at the
scene suggested the fire was started by an accelerant and
circumstantial evidence, including that the business was in
financial turmoil, suggested Ferranti was the arsonist.400 Dr.
Gerald Hurst testified on behalf of the defense, arguing “the
prosecution’s case failed to establish the corpus of arson by
contemporary scientific standards.”401 The court was unshaken
by the scientific advancements proffered by Ferranti:

394. Id. at 464-65.
395. Id.
396. Id. at 465-66.
397. Id. at 465.
398. Ferranti v. United States, No. 05-cv-5222 (ERK), 2010 WL 307445
(E.D.N.Y. Jan. 26, 2010).
399. Id. at *1.
400. Id. at *2.
401. Id. at *8.
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Ferranti simply has not established that no
reasonable fact finder would have found him . . .
guilty of the underlying offense. Even assuming
that Hurst’s declaration is credible, at best it
would neutralize the testimony of [the] Fire
Marshals . . . that the irregular burn patterns
were evidence of the presence of accelerants.
Hurst declared that the irregular burn patterns
seen here may result from post-ignition
flashover, and as such, they were equally
consistent with an accidental fire as they were
with arson. What Hurst’s declaration does not
say, however, is that the fire was initiated by an
electrical malfunction or some other accidental
means. . . . Moreover, much of the other evidence
submitted by Ferranti . . . which could have
caused the burn patterns . . . serves only to
neutralize the testimony of . . . Stickevers and
Kelty [the Fire Marshals] regarding the burn
patterns, but none of that evidence establishes
that the fire was started accidentally.402
Albrecht and Ferranti suggest that courts are placing
extremely high burdens on defendants applying for postconviction relief. The courts in both of these cases demanded
certainty of the defendant’s innocence. As Keith Findley
argues, “while the notion of ‘innocence’ does indeed mean
factual innocence, in the sense that the defendant committed
no crime—to demand certainty is to demand the impossible . . .
.”403
In Green v. Koerner,404 the United States District Court for
the District of Kansas afforded greater weight to a defendant’s
behavior than advances in science.405 In that 2008 case, Debora
Green appealed her conviction for the murders of her two

402.
403.
(2011).
404.
405.
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Id. at *12 (footnote omitted) (citation omitted).
Keith Findley, Defining Innocence, 74 ALB. L. REV. 1157, 1161
No. 07-3262 (RDR), 2008 WL 2079469 (D. Kan. May 15, 2008).
Id. at *4-5.
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children by setting their home on fire in 1996.406 The appeal
was based on advances in fire science. The U.S. District Court
denied the appeal, citing the Kansas Supreme Court’s opinion
that placed circumstantial evidence of her motive and
demeanor over that of the scientific developments in arson.407
For example, the court gave more weight to Green’s “casual
and nonchalant” police interview408 and the presence of a book
in her bedroom about children being killed in an intentionally
set fire,409 than scientific advancements that called into
question whether the fire was arson at all.410
The case of United States v Aman411 suggests that the
publication of the NAS Report has not changed the courts’
reluctance to embrace scientific advancements in the field of
arson investigation. In that case, Aman challenged the
admissibility of the state fire investigator’s evidence on that
the basis that he did not use a reliable methodology, as
required by Daubert.412 The fire investigator had followed
procedures set out in the National Fire Protection Agency’s
Guide for Fire and Explosion Investigations 921 (“NFPA
921”).413
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Virginia found that “[b]ecause the methodology described in
NFPA 921 has been peer reviewed, is generally accepted in the
field of fire investigation, and incorporates the classic scientific
methodology of ‘generating hypotheses and testing them to see
if they can be falsified,’” it satisfied Daubert.414 An error rate
was not strictly required.415 The court reasoned that the NAS
406. Id. at *1.
407. State v. Green, 153 P.3d 1216, 1227 (Kan. 2007).
408. Id. at 1220.
409. Id.
410. Koerner, 2008 WL 2079469, at *2.
411. United States v. Aman, 748 F. Supp. 2d 531 (E.D. Va. 2010).
412. Id. at 535.
413. Id.
414. Id. at 536 (quoting Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc., 509 U.S.
579, 593 (1993)).
415. Id.
While a known error rate is also a factor to be considered in
a Daubert analysis, a known error rate is not strictly
required under Daubert (emphasizing that the Daubert
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Report did not alter this conclusion. This was because (1) the
NAS Report does not recommend barring fire investigators
from testifying based on the NFPA 921 methodology;416 and (2)
the NAS Report does not bind federal courts.417 Furthermore,
Aman could challenge the methodology via crossexamination.418
Between 2000 and 2011, defendants convicted of arson
related crimes have used scientific advances to apply for postconviction relief. Most defendants have argued that the new
science equates to “newly discovered evidence” and/ or evidence
of “actual innocence.” Cases decided in this period of time
suggest that courts remain unpersuaded by arguments that
these advances in fire analysis undermine the traditional
hallmarks of arson investigation. It appears that courts prefer
to take the word of experience-based investigators over those of
scientists who have conducted empirical experiments.
VI. Conclusion
Law is a consumer of a broad spectrum of forensic sciences,
including fingerprint identification, firearms identification, bite
mark identification, and arson investigation. Over the last
century, the law has, and continues to rely on these disciplines
to help it answer important legal questions. Often, experts in
these fields have testified that the methodologies of their
discipline allow them to identify the perpetrator of a crime to
the exclusion of all others. As such, these disciplines have
become a mainstay of the American criminal justice system
that reflects a smooth and mutually convenient relationship
between law and science.

factors are not a “definitive checklist,” and that the inquiry
envisioned by Rule 702 is . . . a flexible one). In all, analysis
of the Daubert factors do not justify excluding Robbins'[s]
methodology as unreliable.
Id. (alteration in original) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
416. Id. at 536.
417. Id.
418. Id.
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However, since the arrival of DNA evidence in the late
1980s, the bar for what evidence is scientifically reliable has
been raised. To date, 302 people have been exonerated by postconviction DNA testing, and over half of these wrongful
convictions can be attributed, in some way, to deficiencies and
errors in forensic science. Furthermore, these serious
deficiencies have been explored in detail and acknowledged by
the National Academy of Sciences and United States Supreme
Court respectively. Resultantly, a vast array of forensic
sciences, including fingerprint identification, firearms
identification, bite mark identification, and arson investigation,
have been subject to mounting scientific and scholarly
criticism. Critics argue that these disciplines are not
underpinned by the scientific method, have unknown errorrates, rely heavily on subjective and experience based
evaluations which can diverge widely, allow for overstated
conclusions, and are governed by inadequate standards. As a
consequence, between 1999 and 2011, the admissibility of
evidence from each of these four disciplines has been
increasingly challenged under Daubert. Defendants convicted
of arson have also used advancements in fire science to make
“newly discovered evidence” and “innocence” claims in postconviction relief procedures.
A snapshot of criminal court responses to legal challenges
concerning friction ridge analysis, tool-mark analysis, forensic
odontology, and fire science between 1999 and 2011 allows us
to make a number of general observations: (1) Despite
significant criticism concerning the veracity of these four
disciplines, the overwhelming majority of courts continue to
admit such evidence. (2) In admitting such evidence, courts
rely heavily on precedent to support their conclusions and on
the adversary system’s ability to weed out unreliable practices
and conclusions. (3) To different extents, courts are engaging
the Daubert standard and the Daubert factors. However,
numerous courts are taking inconsistent and, at times,
contradictory approaches to applying Daubert. (4) Numerous
courts have engaged, to differing degrees, with the criticism
aimed at these four disciplines. In response to certain
criticisms, and in order to inject more reliability into the
evidence admitted, some courts have set out more precise
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procedures for testifying experts to follow, rejected
untraditional evidence, and refused to allow experts to testify
to matches between the defendant and suspect evidence.
Whether these practices deter fact finders from incorrectly
finding liability, however, is questionable. (5) To differing
degrees, numerous courts have engaged the NAS Report across
all four disciplines. To date, the NAS Report has not led any
court to conclude that evidence from any of these four
disciplines is inadmissible. Some court’s discussions of the NAS
Report suggest that the report contains some contradictory or
confusing conclusions. To support their decisions to admit
evidence, multiple courts have relied on the fact that the NAS
Report does not intend to determine the admissibility of
evidence in a particular case.
These general observations highlight the cultural
differences between law and science. In short, although law
and science both seek truth, they take different paths to find it,
and, as many of the cases discussed in this article highlight,
law’s desire to seek the truth often comes in second behind its
need to determine legal proof. Perhaps this is understandable
because law must serve as a way of organizing societies by
providing stability and predictability, whereas science is
encouraged to embrace new ideas so that we can better
understand the natural world. Science is not constrained in the
many ways law is. Despite the growing criticism aimed at
fingerprint identification, firearms identification, bite mark
identification, and arson investigation, experts continue to use
and testify to techniques that have never been scientifically
validated. Moreover, judges seem ill-equipped to recognize the
distinctions between valid and invalid forensic science. Law
remains ill-equipped to incorporate changes in these disciplines
because law is beholden to finality and predictability.
Generally, judges seem to be unable to recognize invalidated
methods or unwilling to banish long-accepted, but unsupported
scientific assertions from the courtroom, perhaps through fear
of upsetting the criminal justice system in unpredictable ways.
As a consequence of these cultural clashes, when forensic
science develops, as it inevitably does, law responds slowly,
reluctantly, and often inconsistently.
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